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Introduction
One of the most influential schools of thought in evaluating the
legal process is law and economics.' Although this discipline has been in
existence for over thirty years, no one has attempted to evaluate whether,
and to what extent, it affects the court's decision in a case. The issues
we consider in this paper are how economic testimony affected the
decision in an actual case and the role afforded by the court to economic
* John H. Harland Professor of Finance, Accounting, and Economics, Goizueta Business
School, Emory University, B.A. 1952, Queens College (N.Y.C.); M.B.A., 1953 New
York University, Ph.D. 1962, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, CPA,
1953 North Carolina.
** Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. B.A. 1964, Washington and
Jefferson College; J.D. 1967, Vanderbilt University School of Law; L.L.M. 1968, S.J.D.
1979, University of Wisconsin Law School. I appreciate the research assistance of
Michelle Marks. Mistakes are mine, however.
1. There are numerous cites to "law and economics" in various cases and law
review articles.
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analysis as contrasted with the law in crafting a decision. This
presentation also provides readers with a review of the issues and
evidence on the important public policy issue of handgun control.
Our methodology is to examine the trial and appeal of Hamilton v.
Beretta2 from both a legal and an economic perspective. Hamilton was
selected because it involves a critical contemporary social issue: handgun
control by means of the judicial process. It was also important that one
author, George Benston, had served as an expert in Hamilton v. Beretta,
and the other author, Frank Vandall, had previously evaluated lawsuits as
a means of regulating gun manufacturers.3 Part I provides background
material on the contentious public policy issue of the role of handguns in
crime and human suffering and the legislative means that have been
adopted to restrict handgun purchase and use. People who believe that
those laws have been inadequate to control handgun misuse and, in order
to obtain compensation and redress, have brought lawsuits against
handgun manufacturers as a means of controlling the criminal use of
handguns, most notably is Hamilton v. Beretta. Part II examines the
legal issues raised by Hamilton and similar cases. Part III presents an
economic analysis of the demand and supply of handguns by ordinary
people and criminals. Much of this information was presented for the
defendants in Hamilton v. Beretta.4 Part IV is an evaluation of the
courts' use of economic testimony, and Part V is an analysis of the legal
reasoning in both the trial court and the New York Court of Appeals. Part
VI concludes with respect to the courts' decisions in Hamilton v. Beretta
and considers the public policy issue of handgun control.
2. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs,
relatives of gunshot victims, sued 49 defendant handgun manufacturers. Plaintiffs assert
various causes of action, including an action for negligence on the theory that defendants
all marketed handguns in a manner that "fostered the growth of a substantial underground
market in handguns" and that defendants were liable under theories of design defect and
ultrahazardous activity. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1314-15
(E.D.N.Y. 1996); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 222 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000); Hamilton v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d
21 (2d Cir. 2001).
3. See Frank J. Vandall, Economic and Causation Issues in City Suits Against Gun
Manufacturers, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 719 (2000) [hereinafter Vandall, Causation Issues]; see
also Frank J. Vandall, O.K. Corral II: Policy Issues in Municipal Suits Against Gun
Manufacturers, 44 VILL. L. REv. 547 (1999) [hereinafter Vandall, O.K Corral Il]. See
Professor Benston's economic arguments infra Part II.
4. The material presented is more extensive than the testimony offered at trial by
Professor Benston, so that readers of this article will have a more complete description
and analysis of what is known about the economics of handgun demand, supply, and
regulation.
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I. The Public Policy Issue of Criminal Misuse of Handguns and
Legislative Actions to Control Handgun Ownership and Use
A. The Public Policy Debate
Handguns (and cigarettes) are perhaps the most controversial of all
products sold legally in the United States. Many people would like to
require registration of handguns and more severely limit handgun
purchase and ownership; some would make it illegal for individuals other
than police and the military to own handguns.5 Both groups point to the
fact that between 1962 and 1994, for example, 667,000 of the more than
1,000,000 firearm-related deaths involved handguns.6 Handguns are
identified as having been used in an overwhelming number of crimes:
"In 1993 there were about 1.3 million such crimes [assaults and
robberies] committed with a firearm-and 86% of the time the weapon
was a handgun.",7 Handguns also are said to be responsible for suicides:
"from 1990 to 1997 there were 147,000 suicides committed with a
firearm in contrast to 100,000 firearm homicides. An estimated 90,000
of those suicides were accomplished with a handgun .... ,,8
Unintentional shootings, particularly when they involve children, are
another reason given to support the need for legislation that would
substantially reduce or eliminate handgun ownership. The Violence
Policy Center reports that "[i]n 1997 there were 981 victims of
unintentional shooting deaths, of whom 142 were aged 14 years old or
younger."
9
In addition to the cost of death and suffering caused by handguns,
there is also the monetary cost. Philip Cook and Jens Ludwig estimate
that handgun violence costs American society about $100 billion a year
(1998 dollars).10 About $1 billion is the cost of medical treatment of
people who are injured as a consequence of handgun-inflicted wounds."1
Another $1 billion is the value of the productivity of people killed or
5. See, e.g., Violence Policy Center, Unsafe in Any Hands: Why America Needs to
Ban Handguns (2000), http://www.vpc.org/studies/unsafe.htm.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. PHILLIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS 113-15
(2000).
11. Id. at70-71, 73.
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seriously injured, net of their maintenance cost. 12 This amount, although
substantial, is not as great as one might expect because, as Cook and
Ludwig note, criminals, who may also be victims, have relatively low
levels of productivity and do not require high-risk premiums for their
dangerous line of work.13 Immigration also can replace injured and
killed workers. Suicides, Cook and Ludwig estimate, result in zero cost
to the economy, because lost productivity is offset by reduced medical
costs. 14 They ascribe the remaining $98 billion of the cost of handgun
violence to people's loss of well being as a result of concerns that they or
others will be injured or killed by handguns.' 5 They estimate this amount
from a random survey that asked respondents how much they would be
willing to pay in taxes to reduce handgun violence by thirty percent.'
6
Although the amounts estimated by Cook and Ludwig are open to
criticism (as they recognize), 17 it seems clear that handguns do a lot of
damage and engender a lot of fear among people generally. For
example, Geoffrey Canada, who writes movingly and specifically about
growing up and later working with violent youth in a very tough urban
neighborhood (the South Bronx in New York City), states:
[i]t's handguns that make living in the inner city so lethal today. People
have been armed and violent for a long time, but the weapon of choice used
to be a bottle or a knife; the explosion of killing we see today is based on
decades of ignoring the issue of violence in our inner cities. Every
indication I see suggests that it's going to get worse. How much worse? I
don't think we understand the potential of how bad it can get. 18
Canada blames demand, supply, and inadequate regulation for this
deplorable state of affairs. 19 Demand, at least by the young people with
whom he works and who have suffered disproportionately from handgun
violence, is a consequence of illegal drugs. He explains,
guns didn't become commonplace among the young until crack use became
epidemic in the eighties. Several separate accidents of history created the
love affair that today's young people have with guns. The first was the
12. Id. at 81.
13. Id. at 82.
14. Id. at 70-71.
15. Id. at 114.
16. Id. at 103.
17. Id.
18. GEOFFREY CANADA, FIST STICK KNIFE GUN: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA 36 (1995).
19. Id. at 36-37.
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unintended consequence of the Rockefeller [New York State] drug laws
[which mandated harsh sentences for adult offenders] bringing children
into the drug trade. 0
He then identifies widespread addiction and high profits from crack
cocaine, which yielded young dealers great sums of money that they
spent on expensive clothes and jewelry. 21 He concludes: "[a]nd, as could
only be expected, other kids began to rob them of their clothes, sneakers,
and jewelry. The answer for almost all of the young dealers was to buy a
handgun for protection.
22
Canada's field observations are supported by an insightful statistical
study by Alfred Blumstein and Richard Rosenfeld of the relationship
between murders, robberies, and assaults and the age and race of
offenders and victims between 1975 and 1995.23 Blumstein and
Rosenfeld present data showing that the per-capita rate of serious crimes
over this period is associated primarily with the proportion of population
in the high-crime ages.24 Following increases and then decreases through
about 1984-85, they show that the crime rate increased substantially
through 1991 followed by a decrease.2 5 Almost all of the post-1985
increase, they find, is in homicides with handguns, predominantly
committed by and against African-American males ages fifteen through
eighteen.26 Blumstein and Rosenfeld ascribe this gun-related violence to
the increased involvement of black youth in distribution of crack cocaine
and the decline after 1993 to an abatement of the crack epidemic.27
Both the Violence Policy Center and Canada (but not Cook/Ludwig
and Blumstein/Rosenfeld) blame the supply side for the increase in gun-
related violence. Canada asserts: "[g]reedy handgun manufacturers and
lax government regulations have helped precipitate in this country a
crisis of unimagined proportions .... Part of the problem is that most
current policymakers fail to address the problem of the sheer availability
of guns.",28  The Violence Policy Center also points to the ready
availability of handguns. They would have Congress "vest the
20. Id. at 80.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 81.
23. See Alfred Blumstein & Richard Rosenfeld, Explaining Recent Trends in U.S.
Homicide Rates, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1175 (1998).
24. Id. at 1202.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1207.
27. Id. at 1208-10.
28. CANADA, supra note 18, at 68.
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Department of the Treasury with strong authority to regulate the design,
manufacture, and distribution of firearms. 29  Indeed, they would
completely ban handguns and have the government buy back civilian-
owned guns.30 Cook and Ludwig would not ban handguns, but would
employ additional government regulation to restrict handgun sales, have
handguns regulated as consumer products, and attempt to reduce the use
of guns by criminals. 31 Blumstein and Rosenfeld, however, suggest
stronger efforts to reduce the demand by young people for handguns,
primarily for drug-related crimes.32
On the other side of the argument, many handgun proponents
believe that individual ownership of these weapons is, and should be,
protected by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which states, "[a] well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed. ,33 Other opponents of additional controls over handguns point
to extensive ownership by law-abiding citizens who find these products
valuable to them.34 They claim that legal handgun ownership reduces
harm inflicted on people from criminal use of handguns, because
criminals fear that intended victims who are armed might injure them. 35
John Lott, Jr. and David Mustard put forth considerable evidence to this
effect, using countywide data from both states with and without laws that
permit most citizens to carry concealed handguns.36 However, other
researchers have questioned the validity of their estimates.37 Thus, the
question as to whether handgun ownership reduces crime has not yet
been resolved.
29. Violence Policy Center, supra note 5.
30. See id.
31. See COOK& LUDWIG, supra note 10, at 132-33.
32. See Blumstein & Rosenfeld, supra note 23, at 1214-15.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
34. See generally HENRY H. KIM, GUNS AND VIOLENCE (1999) (providing a
collection of essays on both sides of the issue).
35. See id.
36. See John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence and Right-to-
Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997); JOHN R. LoTT, JR., MORE
GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS (1998).
37. See Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Paul H. Rubin, Lives Saved or Lives Lost? The
Effects of Concealed-Handgun Laws on Crime, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 468, 468-74 (1998);
Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON., 1086, 1086-1114 (2001).
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B. Legal Controls Over Purchase and Use
Federal, state, and municipal laws regulate and limit the sale and
possession of handguns. The Gun Control Act of 1968 (§ 922 (g)), as
amended by the Firearms Owners' Protection Act (1986) and subsequent
enactments, makes it illegal in all states for federal firearms licensees
(FFLs) to sell handguns to specified persons, including persons under
age 21 (for handguns), convicted felons, fugitives from justice, illegal
aliens, persons subject to a court order restraining them from threatening
others, and people with a history of domestic violence, drug addiction,
and mental disorders. Retail purchasers of firearms from FFLs complete
a Federal Form 4473 in which the buyer attests to the firearms dealer that
he or she is legally qualified to purchase the gun. The buyer also must
certify that he or she is a U.S. citizen or resident alien and is the actual
buyer of the gun (i.e., not buying the gun on behalf of an ineligible
person). Form 4473 informs the prospective buyer that it is a felony
under federal law to give false information to a firearms dealer.
Before passage of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
(1993) (Brady Act), federal law did not require FFLs to verify the
truthfulness of a gun purchaser's statements. Jeremy Travis and William
Smarrito provide examples that support their conclusion that, at the time
of their writing, "the federal system is an honor system." 38 The Brady
Act initially added a waiting period of up to five days before a
prospective (non-licensed) buyer could complete the purchase of a
handgun from a dealer.39 However, since 1998, the FBI offers almost
instant computerized checks that permit gun buyers to complete their
purchases in minutes.40
States impose additional requirements. All states require handgun
sellers to give to the chief law enforcement officer ("CLEO") handgun
purchasers' names, addresses, and dates of birth.41 As shown in Table 1,
twenty-four states have no additional restrictions ("NAR"). 42 Thirteen
states have some restrictions ("SR"), particularly waiting periods,
limitations on the number of handguns that can be purchased in a month,
and sales prohibited to persons who are intoxicated or are not of good
38. Jeremy Travis & William Smarrito, A Modest Proposal to End Gun Running in
America, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 795, 809 (1992).
39. See Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
40. Op-Ed., Gun Control: Instant Checks Faster But Not Perfect, THE MORNING
CALL (Allentown, Pa.), June 2, 2003, at A6.
41. See Table I infra.
42. Id.
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moral character.43 Thirteen states plus the District of Columbia impose
substantial restrictions ("R") on handgun purchases and use, particularly
permits required for purchases, registration, and application of
requirements to private sales at gun shows.4 The more restrictive states
tend to be in the Mid-Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central,
and South Atlantic regions.45 States with no additional restrictions
dominate the Pacific, West South Central, and Mountain regions.46
However, most of the regions include states of each type.47 See Table 1.
Few products that are not per se illegal (such as many addictive
drugs) are as extensively restricted and regulated by federal, state, and
municipal laws. A possible exception is cars. Unlike the situation in
most states for handguns, cars must be registered. Drivers of motor
vehicles must obtain licenses that require tests of vision, knowledge of
driving regulations, and driving proficiency. Only a few states, though,
make gun owners show that they are able to use handguns properly.
However, a 1994 survey finds that 87.2% of handgun owners have either
taken formal training (56.7%) or informal training (30.6%) in handgun
use.
48
Neither the federal government nor most states interfere with or get
information on the private transfer of used handguns. Legally, these
sales and purchases may be made only within states among state
residents. There is no requirement, though, for non-FFLs to report on
sales or purchases or to do background checks. These transactions often
are made through advertisements in newspapers, magazines and personal
contacts. Many of these transactions are also completed at large
gatherings of gun enthusiasts, such as gun shows. However, FFL dealers
who offer their handguns at these shows must complete the same
background checks and paperwork that they are required to do when they
make sales from their regular places of business. As shown in Table 1,
fourteen states impose additional requirements for all sales at gun-shows.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Table 4 infra.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS OF A
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SURVEY ON FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 22 (1996).
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Table 1
State Requirements Governing Purchase and Use of Handguns
By Census Regions
purchase possession
back-
ground restrictions
add add check reqIt also on carry-
overall Limits waiting req'd apply to ing a con- registra-
legal And period permit one per for gun all private cealed license tion
cue- req'it in days re- month shows sales handgun re- required
straints [note 21 [note 31 quired maximum [note 41 (note 51 [note 6] quired [note 71
Y = requirement or additional require-
R = reitrictive ment
SR = somewhat restrict. N = no requirement or no additional YN = yes, nondiscretionary
NAR = no additional requirement YD = yes, discretionary
restrictions F = forbidden
New England
Connecticut
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Mid Atlantic
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
East North Central
Illinois
Michigan
Iowa
Wisconsin
Indiana
Ohio
West North Central
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
South Dakota
Kansas
North Dakota
Pacific
California
Hawaii
Washington
Alaska
Arizona
Oregon
Wyoming
R Y (1) 14 Y
R Y (2,3) 40 Y
SR Y (1) 7 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR Y (1) 0 N
NAR N 0 N
R Y (1) 30 Y
R Y (3) 183 Y
SR Y (1) 0 N
R Y (1) 3 y
R Y (1) 0 Y
SR Y (1,4) 3 Y
SR Y (1) 2 N
NAR Y (1) 0 N
NAR N 0 N
R Y(3) 7 Y
R Y (1) 7 Y
R N 2 Y
SR N 2 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR Y (1) 0 N
R Y (1) 10 N
R Y (1) 14 Y
SR Y (1) 5 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR Y (1) 0 N
NAR N 0 N
N Y Y (1,2,3) YN
N Y(1) Y(1,5) YD
N Y Y (1) YD
N N N YN
N N N YN
N N N N
N Y Y (1,2,4) YD
N Y(2) Y (1,2) YD
N Y (1) Y (3) YN (1)
N Y Y F
N Y Y (1) YD
N N Y(1) YD
N N N F
N N Y (6) YN
N N N F
N Y Y (1) YD
N Y Y (1) F
N Y Y (1,3,4) F
N Y Y (1) YN
N N N F
N N N YN
N Y Y (1,2,3) YD
N Y Y (1,2) YD
N N N YN
N N N YN
N N N YN
N Y (2) Y (7) YN
N N N YN
Y N
Y Y(1)
N N
N N
N N
N N
Y N&Y(3)
Y Y
N N
N N
N N
N N
Y N
Y N
Y N
N N
N N
N N
N Y(1,2)
Y Y
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
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purchase possession
back-
ground restriction
addl addl check req't also on carry-
overall Limits waiting req'd apply to ing a con- registra-
legal And period permit one per for gun all private cealed license tion
con- req't in days re- month show sales handgun re- required
straints [note 21 (note 31 quired maximum [note 41 (note 5] [note 6] quired [note 71
Y = requirement or additional require-
R = restrictive ment
SR = somewhat restrict. N = no requirement or no additional YN = yes, nondiscretionary
NAR = no additional requirement YD = yes, discretionary
restrictions F = forbidden
South Atlantic
Dist. Columbia
Maryland
North Carolina
Delaware
Florida
South Carolina
Virginia
Georgia
West Virginia
East South Central
Alabama
Tennessee
Kentucky
Mississippi
West South Central
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Mountain
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
Utah
R note 1 note 1 note 1 note 1 note 1 note 1 note 1 note 1 note 1
R Y (1) 7 Y
R Y(1) 7 Y
SR Y (1) 0 N
SR N 3 N
SR Y (1) 0 N
SR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
SR N 2 N
SR Y (1) 15 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
SR Y (1) 0 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
NAR N 0 N
Y Y Y(1,2) YD N
Y Y Y(2) YN Y
N N N YD N
N N N YN N
Y N Y(3) N(2) N
Y N N YN N
N N N YN N
N N N YN N
N Y(1)
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
Y(2) Y(7) YD
N N N
N N N
N N N
N N N
N N N
YN N
YN N
YN N
N N
YN N
N N
YN N
YN N
N N
YN N
N N
YN N
F N
YN N
Notes
Note 1. All handguns must be registered, all owners licensed, no handguns may be sold since 1976, hand-
guns may not be brought into or transported through the city.
Note 2. in addition to Federal prohibitions and requirements, some state laws additionally:
(1) prohibit purchases to some persons, primarily those who are habitually or presently intoxicated or con-
victed violent assaults or drug use or sales
(2) applicants must satisfy CLEO (chief local law enforcement officer) that they have a proper purpose and
are suitable persons
(3) applicant must be of good moral character
(4) additional personal descriptions, such as height, weight, hair color, eye color, social security number,
fingerprints, business address, occupation, and previous names and addresses
Note 3. Does not apply to holders of concealed handgun permits
Note 4. Source: Americans for Gun Safety, www.ags.foundation.com
(1) Requirements explicitly extended to gun shows in 1998
(2) Requirements explicitly extended to gun shows in 2000
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Note 5.
(1) same waiting period as for FFL sales
(3) transfers must be made through FFL
(4) transfer certificate from CLEO required
(5) transfer may not be made to a violent felon, alcohol, or drug abuser or by an adult to a child, except under
specified circumstances
(6) background check required
(7) required in Colorado as of 3/31/01 and in Oregon as of 12/7/00
Note 6. Other than for people whose work requires carrying handguns. Source of laws that limit or permit
discretionary carry of concealed handguns is Lott, supra note 36, Figure 3.6.
(1) Philadelphia is exempted from the nondiscretionary-carry law, although people with permits from other
Pennsylvania jurisdictions can carry concealed handguns into the city.
(2) South Carolina removed restriction as of 12/31/96
Note 7.
(1) FFLs must maintain record of transfers that is available to the police.
(2) California requires that all transfers of handguns be made through a FFL.
(3) Chicago requires registration
Sources (except as stated in note 5):
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, aft.treas.gov.gove /firearms / statelaws
Americans for Gun Safety, agsfoundation.com/home.html
National Rifle Association, nraila.org
Americans for Gun Safety, agsfoundation.com /home.html
National Rifle Association, nraila.org
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Individuals and organized groups, who strongly believe that
handguns are an unreasonably dangerous product, believe that the
present legal restrictions on handgun purchase and use are inadequate.
As a means of reducing the supply, particularly to criminals, they have
taken legal action against handgun manufacturers. The next section
examines the legal issues underlying such lawsuits.
II. The Legal Issues in a Suit Against Handgun Manufacturers for
Gun Violence
In considering whether to sue a handgun manufacturer, distributor,
or retailer for the injuries inflicted by a purchaser or a criminal third
party, the plaintiffs have a wide array of legal issues to consider. The
various causes of action facing the plaintiffs will be considered first,
followed by an analysis of the core issues in handgun violence cases.
Because a gun is a product, a preliminary issue is whether to sue the
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of the handgun, rather than the
shooter, who is unidentified or incarcerated and without funds. In
products liability, such a suit can be brought in negligence or strict
liability. Strict liability will be considered first, negligence will be
considered later. 50 A suit in strict liability for manufacturing and selling
a defective product could be based on either design defect or a failure to
warn. Most of the principles dealing with defective products have
evolved from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A. 1
Essentially three tests have developed for whether a product is
defectively designed.5 2 Preliminary to an analysis of design defect, some
courts hold that something must be wrong with the product.53 These
courts would likely dismiss a products liability suit by concluding that
there is nothing wrong with a handgun-it does what it is designed to
do.5 4 New Jersey and California, on the other hand, might decide that the
question is best answered by weighing the risks of the product as
compared with the utility of the product.5 If a jurisdiction were to
49. PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS OF A
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SURVEY ON FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 22 (1996).
50. See negligence discussion infra Part IV.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
52. See JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES, MATERIALS, &
PROBLEMS 147-266 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Kelley v. R.G. Indus. Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1150 (Md. 1985).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
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follow the New Jersey or California approach, it might well find that a
handgun is defective because the risks exceed the utility even though
there is nothing "wrong" with the product. 6
The first test for deciding whether a handgun is defectively designed
is the consumer expectation test.5 7 :This asks whether a reasonable
consumer would expect the product to function as it did. 58 In regard to
handgun litigation the reasonable consumer would likely expect that a
handgun would be used to shoot people, if necessary to defend oneself,
or threaten to or actually shoot people, if the handgun were used in a
criminal activity.59 There is a possibility that the victim of the shooting
could recover under strict liability. In Elmore v. AMC, a defective drive
shaft dropped out of the car, causing it to enter oncoming traffic and
collide with the bystander's car. The court held that strict liability
extended to consumers, users and bystanders.60
The second, and perhaps the most popular test for design defect, is
the risk-utility test.6' This test asks whether the risks of the product
exceed the utility of that particular design.62 If it does, then the product
is defective. Indeed, one court has suggested that a handgun is defective
because it has very high risks and very low social utility.63 The third test
for design defect holds that the jury imputes to the manufacturer the
knowledge of the defective design and then must decide whether a
manufacturer, who produced the product, knowing of the defect, was
negligent.64 There are, of course, a large number of variations among
each of the three tests.65
So far we have been considering design defect from the perspective
of the Restatement (Second), section 402A, which states that a product is
defective when it is unreasonably dangerous. 66 In 1997, the American
56. Id. at 304-05.
57. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1700,
1712-13 (2003).
58. Id.
59. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Corp., 573 P.2d 443, 452, 454-55 (Cal. 1978). There is
some debate as to who is the "consumer."
60. See Elmore v. AMC, 451 P.2d 84, 88-89 (Cal. 1969) (stating, "[i]f anything,
bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the consumer or user where injury
to bystanders. . . is reasonably foreseeable").
61. See Barker, 573 P.2d at 454-55.
62. Id.
63. Kelley v. R.G. Indus. Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1158-59 (Md. 1985).
64. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
65. See PHILLIPS ETAL., supra note 51, at 155.
66. Id.
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Law Institute promulgated the Restatement (Third) of Products Liability,
section 2B. It requires that before a court can hold a product defective, it
must first find that there was a reasonable alternative design for the
product.67 In the ten years since the first promulgation of draft section
2B of the Restatement (Third), only one state in the United States has
adopted the provision 68- Iowa.69 Without any discussion of the issues
or policies, Iowa adopted section 2B for tobacco products liability
litigation. It held that tobacco was not a defective product because there
was no reasonable alternative design for tobacco. 70 A court could find
that, under the Restatement (Third) section 2B, a handgun is not
defective because there is no reasonable alternative design for a handgun.
It does what it is supposed to do; it shoots bullets and can injure or kill
people, can be used to defend people against those who would harm
them, or be used for target shooting, collecting, and other aspects of
recreation.7'
A product can also be defective because it fails to adequately warn
of the risks related to the product.72 The courts have held that a package
insert, the container, or the product itself must contain a reasonable
warning of the risks.73 A suit by a shooting victim based on failure to
warn against a dealer or manufacturer of handguns would likely fail,
however, because the victim would not likely have access to the warning,
whether it was on the package or on the gun. An exception to this might
be a situation in which a handgun is purchased for recreation or for the
defense of the family and purchaser, and where a friend, family member,
or a child who obtained the gun is injured. In that case, a warning might
be of value to the person who purchased the gun.74
One of the leading causes of action in recent suits against the
cigarette manufacturers is fraud.75 The basis of the suits has been that
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2B (1998).
68. See Frank J. Vandall & Joshua F. Vandall, A Call for an Accurate Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Design Defect, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 909, 911 n.2 (2003).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 940.
71. See generally PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 51, at 271-456.
72. See, e.g., Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 818 P.2d 1337 (Wash.
1991).
73. If the defect is obvious, that is often a defense. Sometimes obviousness is
handled under the defense of assumption of risk, however. The shooting victim did not
likely assume the risk, and it was not obvious to her.
74. The warning could say "Caution: Store the gun in a locked cabinet and use a
trigger lock." The obvious nature of the gun might be a defense for the manufacturer.
75. See, e.g., Tompkin v. Am. Brands, 2000 FED App. 0245P (6th Cir.); 219 F.3d
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the manufacturers of cigarettes knew that the cigarettes were addictive
and caused cancer, and failed to warn the consumer of this fact. The
juries, on discovering that the manufacturers had long known of the
injurious nature of tobacco, have held the cigarette manufacturers liable
for misrepresentation and fraud.76 Indeed, one of the first gun-related
products liability suits was based on fraud.77 The gun dealer had falsely
stated the rifle was made by Nock. It exploded and injured the
purchaser's son when he fired it.
A suit based on fraud against a handgun manufacturer will likely
fail because it is clear to consumers and victims alike that handguns are
extremely dangerous.7 8 Fraud, though, may be used to argue that the
manufacturers are aware of alternative means of making handguns safe
and have failed to take advantage of "smart gun" technology.79
A strict liability suit was brought against the manufacturer of a
handgun used to murder a young medical school student, based on the
fact that the sale of a handgun is an abnormally dangerous activity.8 °
This action rested on the Restatement (Second), section 402B. 8 1 The
case was won in the trial court, with the jury finding that the manufacture
and sale of a handgun is an abnormally dangerous activity, but on appeal
the holding was reversed because there was a criminal intervening cause
that severed the liability of the manufacturer.82 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit also held that all previous abnormally dangerous activity
cases dealt with injuries resulting from a defendant using explosives to
blast on his land. In gun cases, land is not an issue and therefore the
"abnormally dangerous activity" theory does not apply.83
One court has held that strict liability should apply to the
manufacturer of a Saturday Night Special, a small, concealable,
566.
76. See Inherent Characteristic Defense Overruled in Tobacco Liability Suit,
HEALTH LAW WEEK, Mar. 17, 2006, at 30.
77. See Langridge v. Levy, [1838] 150 Eng. Rep. 586 (L.R. Exch. 1837).
Apparently Nock was a well-respected manufacturer.
78. In the classic fraud case Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932),
the manufacturer said the windshield glass was "non-shatterable." It was not, and
plaintiff was severely injured. Id. at 410.
79. Vandall, Causation Issues, supra note 3, at 721-22.
80. Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983).
81. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965)).
82. Id. See also discussion on criminal intervening cause infra in this section and
Part IV.
83. Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1256, 1266-68.
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unreliable handgun made of poor materials.84 The decision was based on
the fact that a Saturday Night Special is not safe to use and is not
accurate.85 This case was superseded by statute.86 It is, therefore, of
little precedential value.
Public nuisance may be a cause of action that is available in suits
against handgun manufacturers and dealers.87 The charge to the court in
a public nuisance case is "do what is right." The plaintiff in such a suit
must show a violation of a law or an interference with a public right. 88
Several of the recent public nuisance suits brought by cities against the
gun manufacturers, to recover for the costs of dealing with gun violence,
have been victorious at the trial stage.89 These are presently before the
appellate courts. The final answer to the question whether violation of
public nuisance will be a viable cause of action against gun
manufacturers and dealers is not yet clear.
Negligence is the broadest and most flexible cause of action.90 It
could be argued that the design of a specific handgun was negligent. For
example, a rifle was designed with an inadequate safety mechanism so
that in some circumstances it was possible for the gun to fire without
pressure on the trigger.91 In a Texas case, a rifle was loaded into a car
with the safety engaged. When the safety was switched off, the gun
fired, wounding the driver. 92 A California suit, Merrill v. Navegar, was
brought against a gun manufacturer based on negligent marketing.93 The
case rested on the premise that the manufacturer was careless in
84. Kelley v. R.G. Indus. Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1160 (Md. 1985).
85. Id. at 1154.
86. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36-1(h) (1957) (repealed 2003).
87. See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, China N.
Indus. Corp. v. Ileto, 543 U.S. 1050 (2005) (permitting the district court to proceed with
negligence and public nuisance causes of action); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
88. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86,
617-18 (5th ed. 1984) (a classic example of public nuisance is a house of prostitution or
the blockade of a public road).
89. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir.
2002).
90. See, e.g., FRANK J. VANDALL & ELLEN WERTHEIMER, TORTS: CASES &
PROBLEMS 177 (1997). In general, negligence may be applied to all people and
corporations for injuries caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care. See generally
KEETON, supra note 87, § 28, at 160-61.
91. See STUART M. SPEISER, LAWSUIT 348 (1980).
92. Id.
93. See Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999).
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advertising and targeting her audience.94 California had a statute
providing that no suit could be brought against a gun manufacturer based
on a balance of risk and utility factors, and the California Supreme Court
held that this provision applied to a suit against a gun manufacturer
resting on either negligence or strict liability.95 Shortly after the
California Supreme Court decision, the statute was repealed and it now
appears possible to sue a handgun manufacturer or dealer in California
based on either strict liability or negligence.96 The two most challenging
issues in a negligence suit are cause-in-fact and proximate cause.
97
These are discussed below and in Part V.
The basis of the negligent marketing cause of action in Merrill was
that the manufacturers and dealers failed to exercise reasonable care in
the advertising and marketing of their guns. 98 In that case, the negligent
marketing was based on the defendant placing ads in Soldier of Fortune
magazine, and other magazines that the court believed were aimed at
people who might be drawn toward using guns for criminal purposes. 99
The gun manufacturer also went to great lengths to place his guns in the
hands of actors in various television programs, such as Miami Vice, that
glamorized gun violence.100 In Hamilton v. Beretta, however, the cause
of action for negligent marketing was based on the theory that the gun
manufacturers knew that their guns were being sold beyond the
saturation level in the south, and purchased in large volume by "straw"
purchasers and shipped to cities in the north, such as New York and
Chicago, where handgun sales were very strictly limited.10,
In suits against gun manufacturers and dealers, two of the most
challenging concepts are cause-in-fact and proximate cause.10 2 Cause-in-
fact is a requirement in all civil liability suits. 10 3  The cause-in-fact
concept provides that the conduct of the defendant must have something
94. Id. at 166.
95. See Merrill v. Navegar, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
96. See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
97. See VANDALL & WERTHEIMER, supra note 89, at 261.
98. Merrill, 28 P.3d at 121-23.
99. The court held there was an insufficient showing of cause-in-fact, since there
was no evidence that the perpetrator of the crime had read the ads in Soldier of Fortune
and other such magazines. Id. at 132.
100. Id.
101. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1316 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
102. See discussion of proximate cause infra this section and Part V.
103. VANDALL & WERTHEIMER, supra note 89, at 261.
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to do with the injury to the victim, as a matter of science. 10 4 "There are
two tests for cause-in-fact: the 'but for' test and the 'substantial factor'
test."' 1 5 The "substantial factor" test casts a much broader net than the
"but for" test. The key question is whether the conduct of the defendant
was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs injury. 10 6 In a suit
against a gun manufacturer the question would be: did the manufacture,
distribution, and sale of handguns have something to do with the injury
to the plaintiff as a matter of science? Using the "substantial factor" test,
it could be argued that the manufacture and sale of handguns did indeed
have something to do with the shooting of the victim. 107 In terms of
cause-in-fact, the victim would not have been shot but for the existence
of the defendant's gun; it was a cause-in-fact of his injury.
The concept of market share liability may be important in gun
violence cases. 10 8 Shootings by criminals may create a unique problem in
regard to cause-in-fact (under either the but-for test or the substantial-
factor test) when the gun cannot be found, and therefore the specific
manufacturer cannot be identified. 0 9 The solution to this problem that is
sometimes adopted is known as "market share" liability."0  In the
foundational case where the mother took the drug DES to prevent
miscarriages, the daughter of the woman who took DES developed
vaginal cancer approximately twenty years after the mother took the
drug. The cause-in-fact problem is that there were over three hundred
manufacturers of DES, but neither the mother, nor the doctor who
prescribed it, remembered the name of the manufacturer of the drug."'
Furthermore, most of the pills produced by different manufacturers were
very similar in appearance. The issue presented was whether the suit
should be dismissed, because the actual manufacturer of the particular
drug the mother consumed could not be identified. The solution adopted
in Sindell v. Abbott Labs was to hold the drug manufacturers liable in
proportion to their market share of DES. 1 2 Once the plaintiff sues more
104. Id.
105. Vandall, O.K. Corral II, supra note 3, at 557-58.
106. Id.
107. See generally Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
108. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989).
109. See id.
110. See id. Richard C. Ausness argues that "market share" liability is unfair to gun
manufacturers. See Green, Duty Problem, infra note 142, at 1034.
111. See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1072.
112. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). The New York version
of Sindell is Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1069.
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than fifty percent of the drug manufacturers, the case goes to trial and the
drug manufacturers who have been joined are held liable, not for all of
the plaintiffs damages, but only the percent of the damages that is
equivalent to the market share of the defendant drug manufacturers.
13
The share is decided at the time the suit is tried and, of course, the
plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer was negligent in marketing the
drug. 114 For example, if 60% of the DES manufacturers were joined, the
daughter would recover only 60% of her damages." 5
A similar problem is presented in regard to suits against the
manufacturers and distributors of handguns. Assume that someone is
shot by a criminal, but the specific handgun is not identified, and there
are numerous manufacturers of similar handguns (identified by the spent
shells or identified only as a handgun manufacturer), and the handguns in
question are accepted by the court as being sufficiently similar to be
considered to be a homogeneous group. The market share question is,
should the suit be dismissed (for failure to prove cause-in-fact), or should
it go forward against the manufacturers of the similar handguns, as long
as at least fifty percent of the manufacturers in existence at the time of
the suit are joined? This was a foundational question in Hamilton v.
Beretta.' 16
The most challenging question in torts is proximate cause.
Proximate cause was designed by judges to control the issues that are
given to juries.' 17 It is a matter of policy. 18 In contrast, cause-in-fact is
essentially a question of fact (did Joe's punch cause Tim's broken
nose?).' 19 The issue in proximate cause is whether this defendant should
be liable to this particular plaintiff for this particular injury. 2 ° It is not
accurate to say that everyone is entitled to their day in court because
proximate cause, and therefore what the jury is permitted to hear, is
subject to the judge's control. Proximate cause is the measuring device
used by the courts to decide which cases go to the jury as a question of
113. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 924-26.
114. See id.; see also Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1069.
115. The plaintiff must join more than 50% of the manufacturers. The burden then
shifts to the joined manufacturers as to whether they want to expend the funds to join
other manufacturers. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1072.
116. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1325 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
117. Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REv. 755,
773-74 (1950) [hereinafter Green, Proximate Cause].
118. Id.
119. KEETON, supra note 87, § 41, at 264.
120. Id.
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policy.121  Proximate cause analysis is generally applied after the
defendant is found by the judge to be negligent and also a cause-in-fact
of the injury.12 2
There are two fundamental approaches to dealing with the
proximate cause issue, whether the judge should exercise her discretion
to send the case to the jury. The first is the "rule" approach, and the
second is the "policy," or duty, approach developed by Dean Leon Green
over seventy years ago. The "rule" approach assumes that a precise rule
for proximate cause can be found for resolving all cases. 123 The judge,
therefore, searches for the perfect rule. Perhaps six rules have been
announced by various courts over the last several hundred years as being
the true and correct rule for resolving proximate cause issues. The six
rules are: remote, direct, foreseeable, foreseeable small risk, foreseeable
plaintiff (zone of danger), and practical politics. An examination of the
six rules follows.
The first rule of proximate cause centers on the remoteness of the
defendant's conduct. The rule emanated from an early New York case
where sparks from a train ignited a building owned by the railroad.
24
Sparks from the railroad building then spread to the plaintiffs nearby
building. The plaintiff sued the railroad for damages, but the holding
was that the plaintiff could not recover because his building was remote
from the defendant's sparking train.
1 25
The second popular test for proximate cause is "direct."'126 In the
Polemis case, during unloading of cargo, a plank was carelessly dropped
into the hold of a ship causing a spark that ignited benzene in the hold,
and the resulting fire destroyed the ship. The court held that the
defendant, a lessor, who was in charge of unloading the ship, was liable
because the injury was direct. 127
The important third test for proximate cause is foreseeability. 28 In
the classic case of Wagon Mound I, the defendants were charterers of the
S.S. Wagon Mound, whose servant carelessly allowed oil to spill into the
121. VANDALL & WERTHEIMER, supra note 89, at 289.
122. Id.
123. KEETON, supra note 87, at 272-8 1.
124. See Ryan v. N.Y Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
125. Id.
126. In re Polemis & Furness, Wilthy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
127. Id.
128. KEETON, supra note 87, § 42, at 273.
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bay, where it settled on the surface of the water beside a dock.129 Sparks
from welding on the dock dropped onto cotton that was floating on the
water, and caused the oil to catch fire. The dock, owned by the plaintiff,
was severely damaged by the ensuing fire. The court held that the
defendant, who carelessly discharged the oil, was not liable because it
was not possible to foresee that oil on the top of the water might catch
fire. 13
0
The fourth test is foreseeable small risk. In a related case, Wagon
Mound II, the suit was brought by the owner of a ship tied to the dock. '31
The owner of the ship was able to recover against the defendant ship that
was leaking oil, because the defendant's chief engineer, with his wide
experience in regard to machinery and chemicals, should have been able
to foresee the risk that the oil floating on water could catch fire (a
foreseeable small risk).132
The fifth test for proximate cause is whether the plaintiff is
foreseeable. It was developed in the famous case, Palsgrafv. The Long
Island Railroad Company.133 In Palsgraf, a passenger was running to
catch a departing train while carrying a package wrapped in newspaper.
The package (about the size of a shoe box), was filled with fireworks.
As two railroad employees helped the passenger board the train, the
passenger dropped the box onto the tracks, where it exploded. Over
thirty feet away, a penny scale was knocked over by the force of the
explosion, injuring Mrs. Palsgraf. She brought suit in negligence against
the railroad. The court held in favor of the railroad reasoning that Mrs.
Palsgraf was not a foreseeable plaintiff. 34 She was not within the zone
of danger. The court reasoned that before the court reaches the question
of proximate cause, they must first find a duty on the part of the
defendant, and the duty only extends to a plaintiff who is foreseeable to
the "ordinarily prudent eye.' 35 In Palsgraf, there was no reason to
foresee that the unmarked box contained fireworks and might cause
injury to someone thirty feet away.' 36
129. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., Ltd. (Wagon
Mound I), [1961] 1 App. Cas. 388, 1 All E.R. 404 (J.C. 1961).
130. Id.
131. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. (Wagon Mound II),
[1967] 1 App. Cas. 617, [1966] 2 All E.R. 709 (P.C. 1966).
132. Id.
133. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
134. Id. at 101.
135. Id. at 100.
136. Id. at 99.
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The dissent in Palsgraf has been influential in refining proximate
cause theory.137  Judge Andrews, writing the dissent, reasoned that
everyone owes a duty of care to the entire world.138 Once that duty is
breached, the defendant is liable to the person who is in fact injured by
that breach.1 39 However, Andrews recognized a line demarking liability
must be drawn, based on the practical politics of a particular case.
140
Andrews argued that some injury to someone was foreseeable due to the
pushing of the passenger carrying the box, and since some injury to
someone was foreseeable, the defendant railroad should be liable to Mrs.
Palsgraf, unless there was some reason of practical politics that would
sever the railroad's liability. 141
The second major approach to proximate cause theory was
developed by Dean Leon Green.142  He criticized the rule approach,
arguing that it was rigid and misleading, and could produce bad
results. 143 Instead of searching for the perfect rule, Green argues that
duty rests on policy and should vary with the facts of each case.' 44 In his
numerous articles and books on the subject, he suggests that there are
three fundamental questions that the judge should consider in analyzing
duty. 45 The first is "cause-in-fact." Is there sufficient evidence that the
defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injury? 46
Under either the "but for" or "substantial factor" test, was there sufficient
evidence to send the case to the jury? The second is whether there is
"evidence of negligence.' 47  Is there sufficient evidence that the
defendant failed to exercise care? Assuming the first two questions are
answered in the affirmative, the third is, does the defendant's duty extend
137. Id. at 101-05 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 103.
139. Id.
140. See Frank J. Vandall, Duty: The Continuing Vitality of Dean Green's Theory,
15 QUINNIPAc L. REv. 343, 345 (1995) [hereinafter Vandall, Green's Theory].
141. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103-05 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
142. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV.
1014 (1928) [hereinafter Green, Duty Problem]. Dean Leon Green taught at Yale Law
School and was Dean at Northwestern and Texas Universities.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 1034. Green eliminated proximate cause from the negligence
equation. Id.
145. California defines duty similarly to Dean Green: "[w]hether a legal duty arises
'is a question of law which is simply an expression of the sum total of the policy
considerations that lead a court to conclude that a particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection."' Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003).
146. See Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 116, at 773-74.
147. Id. at 774.
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to this particular plaintiff for this particular injury?1 48 In answering this
critical question, Dean Green suggests a balancing of several factors. He
was very much opposed to a concrete list of factors to be considered in
answering the duty question, because the appropriate policies should be
driven by the facts of the particular case. The thesis of his writings is
that the court should search for a fair and appropriate result in each case.
He asks whether it makes more sense for the victim to bear the loss or
whether the defendant is in a better financial position to bear it. 149 For
example, in a defective automobile case, often the manufacturer is better
able to bear the loss than the injured driver. He also asks, what is the
impact on society of placing the loss on the defendant?1 50 For example,
placing a large loss on a tobacco manufacturer may not affect society in a
negative way, but placing a large award on a drug manufacturer might.
Green was perhaps the first person to look at the administrative factor:
1 51
whether the court is competent to deal with the issue raised in the case
and the issues that will be raised in later cases.1 52 An example of an
administrative problem is when a victim suffers emotional distress as the
sole injury. The courts have had substantial difficulty dealing with such
cases. 1 53 Dean Green also suggests that the availability of insurance is a
relevant factor to consider.1 54  Could the defendant or plaintiff have
purchased insurance and at what cost?1 55  Damage to a plaintiffs
building might be an example of the insurance factor. The plaintiff
knows the value of the building and might be able to obtain insurance to
cover that loss cheaper than the defendant, who does not know the value
of the plaintiffs property. He also suggests precedent as a factor. Green
reasons that if there is a case on point, it should be followed. Finally,
148. Id. at 775.
149. See Green, Duty Problem, supra note 141, at 1034. Bryce A. Jensen accepts
that the gun manufacturers are better able to bear the loss and control the gun market than
the victims. Bryce A Jensen, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond-A Critique of
Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1334, 1374 (2001)
(quoting Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 222 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing the testimony
of Professor Vandall)).
150. See Green, Duty Problem, supra note 141, at 1034.
151. Id. at 1034-35.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
154. See Green, Duty Problem, supra note 141, at 1034; see also Leon Green, The
Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255 (1929) [hereinafter
Green, Duty Problem I1].
155. See Green, Duty Problem, supra note 141, at 1034; see also Green, Duty
Problem II, supra note 153, at 255.
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Dean Green suggests that justice (an open-ended term that allows the
court to consider whatever is important in the case before it when
drawing a duty limitation) may be a consideration in deciding whether to
place a particular loss on the plaintiff or the defendant.
1 56
The quality of the expert witness presented by the plaintiff also is a
potential issue in contemporary products liability cases. In 1993, the
Daubert case changed the rules for expert testimony. 157 Formerly, the
plaintiff in a products case merely had to provide an expert and it was
then the defendant's responsibility to counter with her expert. 158 The
trial was viewed as a war between the experts, and it was the task of the
jury to evaluate the demeanor and the quality of the evidence in deciding
who should win the case.1 59 The Daubert case changed the rules and the
trial court judge is now the gatekeeper and has the obligation and
authority to evaluate whether the plaintiffs expert has sufficient
qualifications and experience in the subject matter of the litigation.16 °
Since Daubert was decided, numerous cases, involving many different
products, have been dismissed because the judge held that the plaintiff's
expert was not qualified to testify.1 6 1 In gun litigation, the plaintiff has
the threshold obligation to produce a qualified expert who has experience
or training in the area and will be able to pass muster under the watchful
eye of the trial court.
A critical issue surrounding all suits against handgun manufacturers
and dealers is the Second Amendment.1 62 The plaintiff will argue that
recent Supreme Court cases have held that guns can be regulated by the
state. 1 63 On the other side, the defendant will argue that the Second
Amendment forbids any regulation of handguns: all gun ownership is a
right protected by the Second Amendment. 164 In United States v.
Emerson, a doctor was arrested for possessing a handgun and threatening
156. See generally Vandall, Green's Theory, supra note 139.
157. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
158. Id. at 590.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 592-93.
161. See, e.g., Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga.
2001); Verzwyvelt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 881 (W.D. La.
2001).
162. The complete wording is: "[a] well regulated militia, being necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
164. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997).
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his wife during the pendency of their divorce.' 65 The wife informed the
authorities and the doctor was arrested and enjoined from carrying a
gun. 166 The issue on appeal was whether the doctor's right to own and
carry a handgun was protected by the Second Amendment.1 67 In the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the majority opinion
held that the federal statute prohibiting the defendant from owning and
carrying a handgun, while under a court order, was constitutional. 168 The
long concurring opinion argued that an individual had a right to possess
firearms and embraced the sanctity of the Second Amendment, but still
agreed with the majority. 169 Emerson was appealed to the Supreme
Court,'7" but the Court refused to grant certiorari, thereby upholding the
Fifth Circuit's narrow holding that the statute prohibiting the husband
from carrying a gun while under a court order was constitutional.
With this survey of legal issues involved in a typical gun violence
case, we can now consider the economic testimony presented in
Hamilton v. Beretta. In Part IV we will examine how the courts dealt
with the specific legal issues raised in the case.
III. An Economic Analysis of a Suit to Regulate the Sale of Handguns as
a Means of Reducing the Criminal Use of Handguns
This section begins with a description of the legal demand by non-
criminals for handguns, because it is essential for understanding why
more extensive government controls have been politically difficult to
achieve and why those who want to restrict the availability of handguns
to criminals (and others) have brought lawsuits against handgun
manufacturers. It also is an important aspect of the handgun
manufacturers' defense in Hamilton v. Beretta, which maintained that
there is a legal demand for and use of handguns by consumers for
purposes other than doing or threatening harm to others, and that the
manufacturers' serve this legitimate demand as do producers of other
products. This is followed by a description of the illegal demand for
handguns, the primary reason for regulation. Next, this section describes
and analyzes the supply of handguns, and notes that regulations govern
165. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536
U.S. 907 (2002).
166. Id. at210.
167. Id. at218-19.
168. Id. at 264-65.
169. Id. at 173-74 (Parker, J., concurring).
170. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002).
25
PACE LAWREVIEW
only about half of the supply. An analysis of supply is crucial for
determining whether additional legal controls, if they could be enacted,
would be effective, and whether lawsuits that seek to restrict and punish
handgun manufacturers are likely to be effective in reducing the supply
of handguns to criminals.
A. Legal Demands for Handguns
Several surveys provide information about the extent to which non-
criminals own handguns. Gary Kleck lists 85 surveys taken from 1959
through 1996 which report that 34 to 53% of households own guns.171 A
1993 survey by Kleck and Marc Gertz finds that 26% of individuals
owned guns. 172 In November and December 1994 Philip Cook and Jens
Ludwig conducted a telephone interview study for the Police Foundation
with a probability sample of 2568 adults. 73 The responses indicate that
35% of U.S. households (and 25% of individuals) owned at least one
working firearm. 74 Cook and Ludwig use these numbers to estimate
that, as of year-end 1994, the public (excluding police and the military)
had 65 million handguns, 119 million long guns (rifles and shotguns),
and 8 million not specified, a total of 192 million firearms in working
order.1
75
Additionally, Kleck points out that surveys are likely to result in
undercounting. 176 He cites a study by Rafferty et al., finding that "as
many as 12.7% [of registered gun owners] may have falsely denied gun
ownership."' 177  In addition, people who own guns illegally, non-
criminals as well as criminals, are very unlikely to disclose this fact to an
interviewer. 78 Furthermore, the people interviewed may not know that
171. GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 98-100
(1997). The survey reporting 53% was taken in 1994. Id.
172. See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence
and Nature of Self-Defense With a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 187 (1995).
173. See Phillip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: Results of a
Comprehensive National Survey on Firearms Ownership and Use, Technical Report,
Police Foundation, Wash. D.C. (1996) at 5 and table 2.1. Of 13,969 possible interviews
that were eligible or not known to be ineligible for inclusion in the study, 2568 interviews
were completed, yielding a response rate of 18.4%.
174. Id. at 35.
175. Id. at 34.
176. See KLECK, supra note 170, at 68.
177. Id.; see also Ann P. Rafferty, Validity of a Household Gun Question in a
Telephone Survey, 110 PUB. HEALTH REP. 282, 284 (1995).
178. See KLECK, supra note 170, at 68.
[Vol. 26:305
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss2/1
2006] LEGAL CONTROL OVER THE SUPPLY OF HANDGUNS 331
someone else in the family owns a gun. In particular, Cook and Ludwig
find that 49% of husbands but only 36% of wives report the presence of a
gun in the same household. 7 9 (Kleck reports a similar, though somewhat
smaller, discrepancy in the GSS data).1 80 And, some people believe
strongly that gun ownership is a private matter or do not trust
interviewers, who, necessarily, they do not know.' 81 This bias towards
undercounting is particularly relevant for handguns. An alternative
measure is provided by Kleck, derived from the number of firearms
produced, imported, and exported. 182 He estimates that in 1994 the
civilian gun stock totaled 235 million guns-over 80 million handguns
and 150 million long guns.
183
Figure 1 shows both measures of the handgun stock as of year-end
1996, computed by adding to Kleck's 1994 numbers (which still are
likely to undercount the stock) the additional four million handguns sold
in 1995 and 1996.184 Also shown are annual sales of handguns (measured
by production net of exports plus imports), 1989 through 1996. As the
figure shows, annual sales are a very small fraction of handguns that are
potentially available to those who demand them.
Figure 1
Number of Privately Owned Working Handguns at Beginning
of Year and Increase During Year
100 "
80 "
60 -
i 40 - - -
20
0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
O 0 beginning of year U imports and net production
179. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 172, at 11.
180. See KLECK, supra note 170, at 96-97.
181. Id. at 68.
182. Id. at 96-97.
183. Id. at64.
184. Id. at 96-97 for 1989-1994; additional amounts for 1995 and 1996 are taken
from Table 5.
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Evidence concerning people's reasons for buying and owning
handguns can be gleaned from marketing surveys of gun purchasers and
from academic surveys of gun owners. As is usual for many companies,
handgun manufacturers employ professional marketing research firms to
learn about their customers. One such survey is the Scout Market
Intelligence.185  It uses responses to a questionnaire sent to 100,000
households, balanced by census region, metropolitan statistical area
(MSA), marital status, and number of people in the household.' 86 The
respondents are asked whether they purchased a spectrum of 120
household products, including handguns, in a calendar quarter. 87 For the
fourth quarter 1992 survey, for example, 71,538 households responded,
of which 1,037 said they had purchased a handgun.' 88 An additional
questionnaire was sent to these people and 724 (69.8%) responded .
89
Table 2 shows the reasons that people buy and own handguns.' 90
Most specified "self-defense."' 9' The percentage is lower for people
who own both handguns and long guns (81.5% versus 58.2%).192
Apparently, many of these people use long guns as a means of self-
defense as well as for other purposes. However, recreation and job-
related uses are substantial for both purchasers and owners, particularly
among those who also own long guns. See Table 2.
These findings are consistent with those of academic studies. Kleck
reviews a large number of studies on the relationship between fear,
victimization, and gun ownership.' 93 The best studies, he says, are by
Lizotte and Bordua and Lizotte et al., which find that "county crime rates
positively affected Rs' [respondents'] perceived level of crime, which in
turn positively and significantly affected fear of crime. Both fear and
prior victimization were significantly and positively associated with gun
ownership for protection."'
' 94
185. Polk Company, NDL.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Table 2 infra.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See KLECK, supra note 170, at 75-79.
194. Id. at 76; see Alan J. Lizotte & David J. Bordua, Firearms Ownership for
Sport and Protection: Two Divergent Models, 45 AM. Soc. REV. 229, 229-44 (1980);
Alan J. Lizotte et al., Firearm Ownership for Sport and Protection: Two Not So
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Table 2
Why People Purchase and Own Handguns
Percentages of Handgun Owners and Purchasers
Purchasers [note 1] Owners [note 2]
Primary Intended Handguns Hand- and
Purpose Use Only Longguns
A. Reasons for Purchasing and Owning Ha
Protection:
personal protection: 40.4
home security 17.0
total self defense 57.4
Recreation:
sport shooting 22.6
silhouette shooting (IHSMA) 1.0
practical shooting (IPSC) 1.0
target/sport shooting 24.6
hunting 5.3
part of a collection 4.0
total recreation 33.9
Job related:
law enforcement 7.9
professional security job 0.9
total job related 8.8
B. Prior Ownership and Later Purchasing
Already own at least one other:
revolver
pistol
Likelihood of purchasing a handgun
next year
very likely
somewhat likely
total
Gun ownership at Time of Handgun
Acquisition:
working handgun
working firearm
handgun in household
gun in household
indguns
76.6
71.0
64.7
12.9
11.9
15.0
21.2
11.4
4.0
Plans
Purchasers
[note 1]
74.6
78.1
20.8
21.9
42.7
11.8
0.5
1.0
13.4
5.1
Owners
[note 2]
Note 1: Respondents were asked to identify the primary use for which they purchased a
handgun (sums to 100%) and their intended use, which can (and often does) be multiple
(hence, sum not relevant)
Source: Scout Statistical Analysis Reports, number of respondent-weighted averages of
two surveys, October 1991 through December 1992 (828-875 respondents) and October
1994 through September 1995 (387 - 425 respondents).
Note 2: Source, Cook and Ludwig [1996]
Panel A: Table 4.6, excluding "don't knows;" "other reason" also is excluded for
comparison with purchasers
Pavnel B: Tb 
.d 1.Diergent #,d6cei , h Am. Soc. REV. 499, 499-503 (198 1).
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Kleck concludes that "the weight of the best available evidence supports
the idea that crime affects handgun ownership, although interpretation of
the evidence is clouded by the fact that associations may simultaneously
reflect both the effects of fear or victimization on gun owning and the
effects of gun ownership on fear and victimization. 2 °°  Cook and
Ludwig find that handgun owners are more likely than non-owners to
have suffered a home burglary or been robbed or attacked in the past
twelve months (They do not indicate whether a handgun was purchased
as a result). °1 Consistent with most of the literature reviewed by Kleck,
they do not find much of a relationship between gun ownership and
fundamental feelings of insecurity.2°2Academic researchers also have
found that gun ownership is, to a significant extent, culturally related.
Kleck reviews this literature and concludes: "The pattern of evidence as
a whole is fully compatible with the thesis that gun ownership is a
product of socialization into a rural hunting culture. 2 °3  Cook and
Ludwig report that "[t]hose whose parents kept guns are three times as
likely as others to own one themselves. In fact, 80% of all current gun
owners report that their parents kept a gun in the home. 20 4
Finally, it is interesting to note why people said they do not
currently own a firearm. Cook and Ludwig asked this question of their
panel. They report that 32.9% say it is because they "can't afford one,
too expensive. 20 5 A substantial proportion, though, believe that "guns
are dangerous to have" (21.6%) or are "opposed to guns" (21.6%).206
To further understand the nature of the demand for handguns, an
extensive review was made of the catalogues of a variety of
manufacturers who were defendants in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek.2 °7 These
195. See KLECK, supra note 170, at 75-79.
196. Id. at 76; see Alan J. Lizotte & David J. Bordua, Firearms Ownership for
Sport and Protection: Two Divergent Models, 45 AM. Soc. REv. 229, 229-44 (1980);
Alan J. Lizotte et al., Firearm Ownership for Sport and Protection: Two Not So
Divergent Models, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 499, 499-503 (1981).
197. See KLECK, supra note 170, at 76.
198. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 172, at 55.
199. See id.
200. See KLECK, supra note 170, at 76.
201. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 172, at 55.
202. See id.
203. KLECK, supra note 170, at 85.
204. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 172, at 55.
205. Id. at 66 table 4.5.
206. Id.
207. The firm not included, Interarms, is an importer.
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companies are representative of the range of manufacturers, from those
who offer a large number of models and kinds of handguns, to those who
produce only a few models. These manufacturers (and their 1994
handgun production net of exports, in thousands of units) include Sturm,
Ruger (290), Smith & Wesson (285), Glock Inc. (199), Colt
Manufacturing Co. (86), Beretta USA and Italy (101), Phoenix Arms
(42), Springfield, Inc. (17), Thompson Center Arms (13), Taurus
International Manufacturing (11), H&R 1871 (8), and Freedom Arms (2).
The handguns offered are suggested for several broad kinds of demands:
personal protection, law enforcement and private security, target
shooting, hunting, and collecting. A very large variety of handgun
calibers, barrel lengths, sizes, finishes, grips, and collateral products,
such as clothing, shotguns, and rifles, are available for purchase. To
avoid boring some readers, only Smith & Wesson and Glock are
presented; the other descriptions are given in a footnote.0 8
208. The 1994 Sturm, Ruger & Co. firearms catalogue shows pictures and
descriptions of rifles, shotguns, and handguns. Among the handguns are 22 single-action
revolvers and 12 autoloading pistols. The revolvers include two .22 rimfire "classics"
recommended for target shooting (plinking) and hunting, two "Old Army" models for
muzzle-loading shooters, a target model first used in the 1890s, two western-style models
(.44-40 and a .45), three new-model .22 LR handguns for Western action shooters, and
two new .44 models. The 9mm pistols include a manual safety model, a double-action
only model, four autoloading models suggested for defensive or action-shooting sports,
two .22 caliber models for plinking, inexpensive practice, or hunting small game, and
five models recommended for target shooting. (catalog on file with authors).
Colt Manufacturing's 1991 catalogue features both long guns and handguns. The
handguns include 42 models of revolvers and 48 models of semiautomatic pistols
featuring different barrel lengths, calibers, finishes, weights, capacity, etc. The handguns
are variously described as rugged, an ideal choice for law enforcement, handgun hunting,
target shooting, and personal, home and business protection.
Beretta USA's 1994 catalogue shows 30 pictures of different pistols. These are
double/single and double-action only in varying finishes and grips, sizes, barrel lengths,
capacity, safety locking features, and so forth. Specific models are suggested for
competitive shooting and range training, military and police work, and personal
protection. The catalogue also includes a large number of long guns and clothing.
(catalog on file with authors).
Phoenix Arms' 1994 catalogue shows two less-expensive semiautomatic pistols for "all
round performance... backed by a no-nonsense 100% Lifetime Warrantee."
Springfield, Inc. sells customized, special-order .45 caliber pistols specifically designed
for shooting sports and for self-defense purposes. (catalog on file with authors).
Thompson/Center Arms Company manufactures only muzzle-loading blackpowder
handguns and single shot pistols. Its Contender pistol is described as "designed as a
hunting/sports pistol" used for both small and big game handgun hunting, as well as
handgun silhouette shooting and plinking. (catalog on file with authors).
Taurus International's 1994 catalogue pictures and describes 18 revolvers and 9
semiautomatic pistols. The revolvers use four calibers of ammunition: .22 long rifle, .38
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The Smith & Wesson 1994 catalogue describes and has pictures of
sixteen models of revolvers, seventeen models of semi-automatic pistols,
and a limited-run performance center revolver. Among the revolvers
there are five small-frame models in two calibers (.22 and .38) that are
described as lightweight and are suggested for personal security and
police and security work. Five medium frame revolvers are offered.
Two are .357 magnums suggested as a police sidearm, one of which is
additionally described as "durable." One is a .38 caliber revolver
described as "traditional, for serious shooters." One is a .22 caliber that
is suggested for training. Six large frame .22 caliber revolvers are
offered for target shooting and outdoor use-beginning plinking, casual
plinking, and competitive target shooting. The pistols include six
compact lightweight 9mm models suggested for personal security and
plain-clothes police duty. Six are full size 9mm models suggested for
law enforcement. Five .22 long rifle models are offered for target
shooting-beginning and casual plinking, and competitive shooting. In
addition, the Smith & Wesson catalogue features handcuffs, engraving
services for handguns, and apparel.
Glock, Inc. sold nine different models of pistols from 1989 through
1994, all made of polymer and steel construction. These varied among
calibers, sizes, and magazine capacities. Model G17 is offered as a law
enforcement and military service pistol. Models G22 and G23 are "FBI
issue" pistols. Model G20 is recommended for hunting and the "C"
series are recommended for competitive sports shooting.
special, .357 magnum, and .44 special. They variously hold from five to nine rounds and
have varying barrel types and weights. The small-frame models are suggested as trail
guns, for personal defense, and for beginning target shooting. The medium-frame
revolvers are offered as sporting guns, for rural police work and backpack campers, as
well as for personal defense. The .44 magnum large-frame revolvers are for close-range,
big game hunting. The semiautomatic pistols include two small-frame models that "may
most commonly serve as a concealed carry gun or policeman's backup... [but] many
sportsmen are taking up the little .22 and .25 autos as ideal informal plinkers and pest
control guns." A medium-frame .380 also is offered for sport shooting. Three 9mm
large-frame pistols are shown, with finishes resistant to salt water and suggested for
police and security personnel. Two .40 and one .45 caliber pistols complete the line; their
descriptions emphasize power and safety. (catalog on file with authors).
H&R 1871, Inc. manufactures .22 and .32 caliber revolvers, used primarily by plinkers
who prefer nine-shot capacity. The company also produces handguns that replicate
historical firearms. (catalog on file with authors).
Freedom Arms' catalogue features the "454 Casull," described as a "primary hunting
firearm or a backup while hunting large, dangerous game." Other revolvers are described
in the catalogue as made for "varmint" hunting and serious competition. (catalog on file
with authors).
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These descriptions (and those presented in the footnote) are
inconsistent with some gun-control advocates' assertions that the only
real purpose of handguns is to kill or hurt people. Not only do people
own guns for multiple purposes, but most gun purchasers already owned
a handgun at the time of their most recent purchase and intend to
purchase additional handguns, as shown in Panel A of Table 3. Gun
owners also generally own many guns (three at the median), as shown in
Panel B of Table 3. Kleck's analysis finds that "an average of over five
guns [per household] are owned, considerably higher than most survey
data suggest. The distribution, however, is undoubtedly skewed to the
right, with a few households owning very large numbers of guns. 2 °9 See
Table 3.
B. The Effect of Laws on the Legal Demand for Handguns
Non-criminal consumers in states that impose fewer and less-costly
restrictions on handgun purchase and use are likely to demand more
handguns, all other things equal. Moreover, state legislators probably
would not enact restrictive laws when citizens generally want to use or
do not object to others using handguns. Hence, cross-section studies
could yield potentially misleading results. Although the restrictiveness
of state laws (shown in Table 1) is not homogeneous within census
regions, it does accord generally with the purchase and ownership data
by location (cities v. rural and census regions) presented in Table 4. This
table shows that the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions, which have
about half as many handgun purchasers and owners to population, also
include three states with "no additional restrictions" (NAR). However,
Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont are low population states and the
region is dominated by the "restrictive" (R) states of Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and New York. The regions with approximately similar number
of purchasers and owners to population of East North Central, West
North Central, Pacific, and South Atlantic include each of the three kinds
of states. States in the three regions with relatively more handgun
purchasers and owners than population are dominated by NAR states,
with only three "somewhat restrictive" (SR) states and no R states. See
Table 4.
209. KLECK, supra note 170, at 69.
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Table 3
How Often and How Many Guns People Buy and Own
Percentages of Handgun Owners, Purchasers,
and Enthusiasts
A. Handgun Purchases
Owners Purchasers Enthusiasts
[note 1] [note 2] [note 31
Already own at least one
other:
revolver 74.6
pistol 78.1
Likelihood of purchasing
a handgun next year:
very likely 20.8
somewhat likely 21.9
total 42.7 71.0
Gun Ownership at Time
of Handgun Acquisition:
working handgun 65.0
working firearm 76.9
handgun in household 80.0
gun in household 69.9
B. Number of handguns and longguns owned by households which own guns
cumulative
percentage %
4 or more guns 34.3 34.3
3 13.3 47.6
2 22.3 69.9
1 30.1 100.0
Number of handguns owned by "enthusiastic" handgun owners [note 2]:
average
cumulative number of
percentage % guns owned
9 or more guns 5.2 9 or more guns 5.2 5.2 3.0
8 1.7 8 1.7 6.9 2.6
7 2.5 7 2.5 9.4 2.5
6 2.5 6 2.5 11.9 2.4
5 7.2 5 7.2 19.1 2.3
4 10.7 4 10.7 29.8 2.0
3 17.0 3 17.0 46.8 1.8
2 25.2 2 25.2 72.0 1.5
1 27.9 1 27.9 100.0 1.0
Note 1: Source, Cook and Ludwig [1996], Tables 4.6 and 3.15
Note 2: Source, Scout Statistical Tabular Analysis Reports, respondent weighted aver-
ages of two surveys (see Table 1, note 1)
Note 3: B&T survey mailed to 2500 handgun owners nationwide obtained from Peter-
sen's Handguns,
a "handgun enthusiasts" magazine, March 1993, 414 responses, 16.6% response rate
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Table 4
Where Handgun Purchasers and Owners Live
Percentages of respondents who purchased or own a
handgun [note 11
percentages of
U.S. owners
handgun handgun population purchasers % of
purchasers owners 1990 census % of U.S. U.S
A. Primary residence
owner 63.6
renter 36.4
B. Location of Residence
central city 27.8
non-central city 43.6
total cities 71.4
rural (note 2) 28.5
C. Area of Residence (Census Regions)
New England (CT, ME,
MA, NH, RI, VT) 2.9
Mid Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA) 8.9
East North Central (IL,
IN, IA,MI, OH, WI) 13.2
West North Central (KS,
MN, MO, NE, ND, SD) 6.1
Pacific (AK, AZ, CA, HI,
OR, WA, WY) 18.7
South Atlantic (DC, DE,
FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA,
WV) 17.5
East South Central (AL,
KY, MS, TN) 8.6
West South Central (AR,
LA, OK, TX) 15.4
Mountain (CO, ID, MT,
NV, NM, UT) 8.8
note 2 66.2
note 2 33.8
note 2
note 2
79.9
21.1
3.1
7.4
16.3
note 2
note 2
75.2
24.8
5.3
15.1
18.0
96.2
107.4
95.0 106.3
115.1 85.1
54.9 58.1
58.7 48.9
73.2 90.3
4.7 6.0 102.5 79.2
108.8 90.9
100.0 113.2
9.3 6.1 141.0 152.1
143.4 166.4
5.9 4.0 219.6 147.2
Note 1: sources - handgun purchasers, Scout Market Intelligence surveys handgun
owners - General Social Surveys (GSS) conducted by the National Opinion Research
Center, Kleck [1997], Table 3.4
Note 2: not reported
Note 3: for owners, defined as places with under 5,000 population; for purchasers and
U.S., defined as places with under 2,500 population
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Interestingly, the possibility that more restrictive federal laws might
be enacted appears to have increased the demand for handguns. Prior to
passage of the 1993 Brady Act and the 1994 Public Safety and
Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, many people feared that a law
requiring registration of handguns or licensing of handgun owners would
be passed. Some even thought that an outright ban on handguns might
be enacted. These people had strong incentives to purchase handguns
before such a restrictive law went into effect, if it were passed. The data
on handgun supply, presented below, shows a substantial increase in
output in 1993 and 1994 that appears to have been driven by this increase
in demand.21°
C. Illegal but Non-Criminal Demand for Handguns
It is not known how many people illegally own handguns for non-
criminal purposes, most likely for self-defense. As noted earlier, some
jurisdictions (notably Washington D.C., New York City, and Chicago)
either prohibit or severely restrict the legal ownership of handguns.
Some other states make it costly or difficult for people to own guns (see
Table 1). Nevertheless, some people believe that a handgun offers them
protection that they otherwise could not obtain or afford, and they are
willing to break the law to obtain that protection. They might have
experienced robberies and muggings or other assaults, or have known or
heard about people who have been subjected to such attacks. They might
be old or infirm, or female and vulnerable to the horrors of rape. They
may have jobs or family situations that put them in danger and are unable
to convince the authorities to grant them a permit to own or carry a
handgun. They may live in neighborhoods that they perceive as
dangerous, and they believe that they cannot rely on the police for
protection.
Of course, people who may not legally own a handgun could
substitute other means of protection, such as window bars, dogs, alarm
systems, mace, and personal sirens. They also could live in protected
communities and homes, such as gated and guarded compounds and
apartment houses that restrict entry with doormen. However, many
people, particularly the poor and those who live in rural areas, are likely
to find these means of personal protection excessively expensive or
believe them to be insufficiently effective. For these people, the benefits
from protection and a reduction in fear apparently exceed the cost of
210. See infra Table 5.
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violating the law and being caught and possibly prosecuted. In addition,
ordinary people might inadvertently or unthinkingly violate local laws by
keeping a handgun without a permit. This could occur if they moved
with handguns from localities where they did not need a license and did
not bother to or know that they had to get a permit in their new place of
residence. This section does not classify these people as "criminals."
D. Criminals' Demand for Handguns
Criminals demand handguns primarily for three purposes. One is to
threaten people as a means of getting them to part with their property or,
worse yet, to surrender their persons. Handguns offer the advantages of
being small and powerful, easy to carry and conceal, and usually
effective for intimidating people (particularly if the victims are not
similarly armed). Handguns also can be used to hurt and kill people. Of
course, other weapons-such as knives and clubs--can be and often are
used for these purposes. 211  A second purpose is similar to that
motivating non-criminals-self defense. Criminals cannot turn to the
police for protection against other criminals. In fact, they are more
vulnerable than are other people to predators. They often have goods,
such as cash and drugs, worth stealing. Their associates are often violent
and have few reservations against using violent means to get what they
want. Third, criminals cannot use the courts to enforce agreements or
ordinary business means to defend and expand their turf. Rather, they
must either use violence or its threat to expand or defend their share of
illegal markets.
James Wright and Peter Rossi studied the use of firearms by
criminals.212 They gathered information on gun use by convicted felons
from 1732 felons jailed in the prisons of ten states.213 Three-quarters of
these owed a gun at one time or another; of these, 87% owned a
handgun.214 Thus, even though handguns were readily available to the
211. KLECK, supra note 170, at 215-59 (outlining and evaluating the substantial
literature on the relative damage caused by violent-prone people with guns and other
weapons and the empirical studies of the relationship between the availability of guns and
the incidence of violent crime). Kleck concludes, "the hypothesis that general gun
availability causes increases in rates of homicide and other violent crimes is not
supported." Id. at 258. Other researchers disagree. For present purposes, it is not
necessary for me to join this debate.
212. See JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSi, ARMED AND CONSIDERED
DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS (1994).
213. See id. at 80.
214. Id.
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felons (as described below), many chose other weapons. Among those
who had owned a gun, 28% said they got it specifically to use in crime;
however, 50% of these said they never actually fired a gun at anyone.25
Most of the 50% who fired a gun said they did so to protect themselves
(66%); 39% said they fired a gun while committing a crime.216
When asked why they obtained their most recent handgun, the
convicted felons reported the following "very important" and "somewhat
important" reasons (in order of "very important"):
217
somewhat
very important important total
Protection 58% 26% 84%
Target shooting 31 31 62
Just wanted one 26 36 62
To use in crimes 28 20 48
Hunting 26 20 46
Gun collecting 25 19 44
Stole to sell 17 18 35
Need to get someone 10 10 20
Remarkably, perhaps, criminals' demands for guns are similar to
those of non-criminals, except in the criminals' demand for handguns to
use in crime and as objects to steal and subsequently sell.
The features that criminals prefer in guns also provide some insights
into their demands. Wright and Rossi's felons identify the following gun
characteristics as "very important" or "somewhat important" to them (in
order of "very important"): 21
8
215. Id. at81.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 137.
218. Id. at 163.
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss2/1
2006] LEGAL CONTROL OVER THE SUPPLY OFHANDGUNS 343
somewhat single most
very important important total important
Accurate 62% 21% 83% 9%
Untraceable 60 12 72 13
Well made 58 20 78 17
Easy to shoot 54 24 78 2
Concealable 50 25 75 13
Easy to get 48 23 71 4
Ammunition easy to get 45 26 71 2
Firepower 42 25 67 22
Fewer than 43% listed the following traits as total important (very
important plus somewhat important): cheap, small caliber, scary-looking,
and cheap ammunition. 219  Wright and Rossi conducted additional
analyses, which lead them to conclude: "the felons in our sample neither
preferred to own, nor did they actually own, small, cheap, low-quality
handguns. The strong preference, rather, was for large, well-made
guns. '220 This preference "was especially strong among felons who had
owned guns and who had used guns to commit crimes.
221
Additional insights may be obtained from a study conducted by
Joseph Sheley and James Wright in 1991 of 835 male inmates in six
reformatories and 758 male students in ten inner-city high schools.2 22
They found that, similar to adult criminals, 83% of the inmates owned
some kind of gun just prior to confinement and 58% owned a handgun.22 3
Among the inner-city students, though, only 22% currently owned a gun,
and 18% owned a handgun.224 They asked questions about desirable
handgun traits shown above and received similar answers. 5
Summarizing their findings, Shelley and Wright say:
219. Id.
220. Id. at 15.
221. Id. at 16.
222. JOSEPH F. SHELEY & JAMES D. WRIGHT, IN THE LINE OF FIRE: YOUTH, GUNS,
AND VIOLENCE IN URBAN AMERICA 40 (1995).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 42. Other studies, cited and summarized by Hemeneway, et. al, report
similar findings; the percentages of gun ownership range from thirteen to twenty-five
percent), particularly for African-American males in inner-city schools. David
Hemenway, et. al, Gun Carrying Among Adolescents, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS, 39, 40
(1996).
225. Id. at 45.
39
PACE LA WREVIEW
The profile of desirable features was remarkably similar in both groups.
Among inmates, the three highest traits were firepower, quality of
construction, and difficulty in tracing ownership, followed by being easy to
shoot and accurate. Among students, quality of construction was the
highest rated trait, followed by being easy to shoot, accurate, untraceable,
and with high firepower.
226
The demand for handguns for protection is even more pronounced
in the youth samples than among the adult criminals, perhaps reflecting
conditions in a later decade. The most important of the "very important"
reasons given by 80% of the inmates for carrying a gun during a crime
was "have to be ready to defend self., 227 The next most important reason
given by 58% is "chance victim would be armed," followed by "might
need weapon to escape" (49%), "victim won't put up a fight" (45%), and
"people don't mess with armed offender" (42%).228 The inmates were
likely to carry guns primarily when they felt they were in danger.2 29 For
example, 75% said they needed a handgun "when needing protection,"
and 72% said "when in a strange area., 230 In contrast, 37% said they
carried a gun "when planning to do a crime. 23  Indeed, Shelley and
Wright say "that the juvenile's decision to arm himself is motivated
primarily by a sensed need for self-preservation., 232 They also find that
most of our inmate respondents had used guns to intimidate others and
had guns used against them.233 Much of the self-protection they sought,
in short, was protection against one another. Likewise, it seems probable
that many of our high school student respondents felt some need to
protect themselves against one another and nearly certain that they felt a
need to protect against the sorts of juveniles represented in the inmate
sample.
Shelley and Wright conclude: "[tihe perception that one's very
survival depends on being armed makes a weapon a necessity at nearly
any cost. 2 3 4 Thus, these studies indicate that increasing the retail costs
of handguns is unlikely to have much effect on criminals' demands for
these weapons.
226. Id. at 45-46.
227. Id. at 62.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 65.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 67.
233. Id. at 68-69.
234. Id. at71.
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E. Supply of Handguns
1. Regulated, Legal Supply of New Handguns to Non-Criminal
Consumers
Federal legislation governs the production, importation, distribution,
and sale of firearms. Manufacturers, importers, distributors, and retailers
must be federal firearms licensees (FFLs). The 1993 Brady Act
increased the annual fee for an FFL from $10 to $200 for three years and
$90 for each additional three-year period. 35 The Crime Control Act of
1994 further amended the licensing provisions of the GCA by requiring
all FFL applicants to submit a photograph and fingerprints with an
application.236 Largely as a consequence, the number of FFLs, which
had increased to 284,000 in 1993, decreased to 104,000 in 2000. Of
these, 79% are retail gun dealers and pawnbrokers, 17% collectors, and
4% manufacturers and importers.2 37 A 1998 ATF study "disclosed that
44 percent of the retail dealers operated out of commercial premises and
56 percent out of residential premises (down from 74% in 1992). "238
The organization of regulated suppliers of new handguns is now
described, including the number of handguns produced and imported
annually from 1989 through 1996.239 These data indicate that the
industry is very competitive and capable of expanding the supply of new
handguns very quickly, which has important implications for regulatory
proposals.
The size, scope, production methods, and longevity of the domestic
firearms manufacturers and importers vary substantially. As of March
1995, ATF lists 687 companies as having manufactured or imported
firearms at one time or another.240  From 1989 through 1996, 116
235. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 303, 107
Stat. 1536, 1546 (1993).
236. See Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 110301(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2012 (1994).
237. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES
Figure 8 (Washington D.C., U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms 2000) available at http://www.virtualref.com/govdocs
/34.htm [hereinafter COMMERCE IN FIREARMS].
238. Id. at 16.
239. For purposes of this presentation, all handguns have been lumped together, not
distinguishing among the many different kinds described earlier.
240. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, ATF Handbook 1997 (not
produced for later years).
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companies reported to ATF that they produced at least 250 handguns in
any one year; 45 of these companies exported handguns (Between 6 and
32 additional firms a year produced less than 250 handguns). Within the
period, the number of companies with net domestic production
(production less exports) has varied, as follows:
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
New producers 8 10 7 19 8 6 7 65
No longer -8 -9 -15 -8 -8 -15 -5 -68
producing
Number
producing 51 51 52 44 55 55 46 48
Note: one company did not report production in 1995; hence, it is counted as a new
1996 company. In addition, handguns were imported from 39 different countries,
including five from which less than 250 units were imported
Table 5 is constructed using production and export data reported to
ATF and imports reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce. 24' For
purposes of this table and the following analysis, all of the various
models and kinds (revolvers and pistols) of handguns produced were
aggregated. Panel A of the table shows the number of handguns (in
thousands) imported and produced domestically, net of exports. The
total number ranges between 2.0 million (1996) and 3.8 million (1994).
With 1989 as the base (=100), the number has changed substantially over
the period, first decreasing through 1991 to 90% of the 1989 base, then
increasing to 150% through 1994. These figures are consistent with the
belief that consumers increased their demand for handguns out of
concern that a law would be enacted that would restrain them from
obtaining handguns legally. The number then dropped in 1995 and 1996
to 92 and 78% of 1989, perhaps because many consumers had purchased
the handguns they demanded in the earlier years. The annual percentage
of imports also has varied over the period, from a low of 26% in 1989 to
a high of 36% in 1994, which indicates the ability of distributors to
obtain handguns from overseas in response to consumer demand (and
available supplies). See Table 5.
241. This exercise was far from trivial. Annual reports of 116 individual companies
obtained from ATF under the Freedom of Information Act had to be recorded and
summarized. Imports could be assigned to most of the individual companies with data
made available to Professor Benston in his capacity as an expert witness in a case
involving many of the companies. See COMMERCE 1N FIREARMS, supra note 231.
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Table 5
Handguns Imported and Domestically Produced (net of
Exports) and Privately Owned, 1989 through 1996
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
A. Imports and Net Production (in thousands)
imports 657 681 658 938 1,209 1,392 825 664
domestic net production 1,915 1,672 1,663 1,836 2,571 2,467 1,546 1,331
total 2,571 2,353 2,321 2,773 3,780 3,858 2,371 1,995
annual change as % of 1989 100% 91% 90% 108% 147% 150% 92% 78%
imports as % of total 26% 29% 28% 34% 32% 36% 35% 33%
B. Number of Privately Owned Working Handguns, millions of units [note 2]
beginning of year 66.9 69.5 71.8 74.1 76.9 80.7 84.6 86.9
imports and net production 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.8 3.8 3.9 2.4 2.0
end of year 69.5 71.8 74.1 76.9 80.7 84.6 86.9 88.9
increase % over prior year 3.8% 3.4% 3.2% 3.7% 4.9% 4.8% 2.8% 2.3%
C. Percentages of the Annual Domestic Increase of Handguns Provided by
Manufacturers and Importers with at least 250 Units per Year in 1989
By Quintiles of Companies in 1989 Plus Additional Producers in 1990
through 1996
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Top 20% in 1989 76.1 70.0 51.9 47.2 43.2 42.5 49.9 48.2
Next 20-40% in 1989 12.1 10.7 10.4 10.4 9.1 10.6 12.4 14.2
Next 40-60% in 1989 6.9 7.3 9.6 13.7 12.8 7.4 6.5 6.5
Next 60-80% in 1989 3.5 3.9 11.2 10.3 10.4 8.9 4.9 3.3
Next 80-100% in 1989 1.4 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
new producers 7.3 16.0 17.6 23.8 29.9 25.7 27.1
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources:
Panel A: ATF (domestic) and Department of Commerce (Imports)
Panel B: 1995 per Cook and Ludwig [1996], Table 3.1 for 1995, adjusted for earlier
and later years by subtracting imports plus net domestic production per Panel A
Panel A: ATF (domestic) with Department of Commerce (Imports) data assigned to
individual companies with data provided by the companies.
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Panel B relates the annual number sold (assuming no change in
inventories) to the stock of privately owned working handguns. The
percentage addition to the stock (assuming no handguns were destroyed
or lost) varies from a low of 2.9% in 1996 to a high of 6.2% in 1993.
Thus, the overwhelming number of handguns available for non-criminal
and criminal use appears to be met primarily from the stock rather than
the annual flow.
Panel C and Figure 2 provide a measure of the extent to which the
imports and net production of individual companies have varied over the
period. Companies were ranked by number of handguns imported and
produced (net of exports) and aggregated them in quintiles of the number
in 1989. In that year, the top 20% of companies produced 76.1% of the
total. Those companies' share of the market decreased to a low of 42.5%
in 1994, as new producers entered the market to meet the substantial
increase in consumer demand. In addition to the four major companies
that produced over 100,000 units in 1993 and 1994, (Beretta USA, Smith
and Wesson, Sturm-Ruger, and Davis Industries), four companies that
produced no or few handguns in 1989 (Colt's Manufacturing, Bryco,
Navegar/Intratec, and Phoenix), produced over 100,000 handguns in
1993 and/or 1994. Their production subsequently declined substantially.
Figure 2
Percentages of Annual Domestic Increase of Handguns Provided
by Manufacturers and Importers with at least 250 Units
By Quintiles of Companies in 1989
plus Additional Producers in 1990-1996
100%
80%
60%_
40%1
20% -
0%
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
O Top 20% in 1989 U Next 20-40% in 1989 0 Next 40-60% in 1989
o Next 60-80% in 1989 U Next 80-100% in 1989 0 new producers
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These data indicate that the supply of handguns is very elastic; it can
increase substantially within a year from additional imports and
expansion of domestic production. In addition, the stock of working
handguns is some twenty to thirty times annual production. These
factors have important implications for regulatory policy.
Distributors, similar to manufacturers, almost never sell directly to
consumers, for two important reasons. One is simply the cost of
developing and maintaining retail outlets, particularly as noted above,
when consumers want goods that the distributor does not carry. The
other is avoidance of conflicts with retailers who might view distributors'
retail sales as unfair competition.
Hundreds of firms distribute new handguns in the United States.
Shooting Industry magazine produces a list of distributors for its annual
Shot Show Super Issue, in which they identify by code whether the firms
listed distribute each of eight shooting-related products: firearms,
ammunition, leather, archery, reloading tools, reloading components,
scopes and accessories, and firearm accessories. This list is updated
annually. Only four percent of the distributors listed carry only guns.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the number of distributors in each census
region of the United States in each of five years, first in 1989 and then,
beginning in 1990, every other year through 1996. Although distributors
are willing to sell to retailers anywhere, it is likely that they serve areas
closer to the location of their warehouses, as this gives them an
advantage over competitors with respect to shipping expenses. See Table
6.
From these data, it should be apparent that handguns are distributed
by many distributors and that the number changes substantially over the
period examined. In part, the change is due to a tightening of standards
for inclusion by the editor of Shooting Industry. After 1994, his
publication sought to eliminate firms that were but minor distributors
from the list. 242 A substantial portion of the reduction in the number
from 250 in 1994 to 176 in 1996 is due to this effort. Keeping this
change in mind, it is apparent that there are few barriers to entry and exit,
which is consistent with a competitive market for distribution.
Distributors of handguns are located in almost all states of the United
243 244States. 24 However, relatively more are located in the southern states.
242. Telephone Interview with Russ Thurman, Editor, Shooting Industry (Oct. 5,
1998).
243. Shooting Industry Magazine, Shot Show Issues.
244. See id.
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Table 6
Handgun Distributors
1989 1990 1992 1994 1996
A. Number
New England
Mid Atlantic
northeast
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
south
East North Central
West North Central
midwest
Pacific
Mountain
west
total
B. Percentages of total
New England
Mid Atlantic
northeast
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
south
East North Central
West North Central
midwest
Pacific
Mountain
west
total
16 20 20
32 40 40
48 60 60
32 45 48
15 16 17
33 34 34
80 95 99
40 46 46
21 23 29
61 69 75
32 45 42
18 20 17
50 65 59
239 289 293
6.7 6.9 6.8
13.4 13.8 13.7
20.1 20.8 20.5
13.4 15.6 16.4
6.3 5.5 5.8
13.8 11.8 11.6
33.5 32.9 33.8
16.7 15.9 15.7
8.8 8.0 9.9
25.5 23.9 25.6
13.4 15.6 14.3
7.5 6.9 5.8
20.9 22.5 20.1
100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Shooting Industry Magazine, "Shot Show" issues
19
37
56
43
12
23
78
35
31
66
35
15
50
250
7.6
14.8
22.4
17.2
4.8
9.2
31.2
14.0
12.4
26.4
14.0
6.0
20.0
100.0
15
23
38
33
10
16
59
27
19
46
24
9
33
176
8.5
13.1
21.6
18.8
5.7
9.1
33.5
15.3
10.8
26.1
13.6
5.1
18.8
100.0
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss2/1
2006] LEGAL CONTROL OVER THE SUPPLY OF HANDGUNS 351
Specifically, in 1996, the East South Central, West South Central and
South Atlantic states had 59 distributors, compared to 38 in the Middle
Atlantic and New England states. The percentages of the total presented
in Panel B of Table 6 also indicate that the number of distributors
roughly mirrors the distribution of gun owners, as shown in Table 4.
Consumers purchase handguns from thousands of retail stores. The
publication, The U.S. Market for Firearms & Accessories, 1992-1997
states: "[a]ccording to knowledgeable people in the industry, there are
between 13,000 and 16,000 independent retailers of hunting supplies in
the United States. For the most part, the primary firearms suppliers will
go through the wholesalers to get to the independent retailers., 248 The
Shooting Sports Foundation lists 8815 firearms dealers.2 49 As of October
1999, federal firearms licenses were held by 71,290 people who
identified themselves as retail gun dealers and 10,035 as pawnbrokers.250
An ATF study of a random sample of retail dealers and pawnshops found
251that 56% of the retail gun dealers operated out of residential premises.
Among the balance in commercial premises, 25% were gunshops,
hardware stores, or sporting goods stores and "[t]he remainder were
located in businesses such as funeral homes and auto parts stores, and
other businesses not normally associated with a gun business. 2  About
68% of the residential dealers were located in rural areas. 253
2. Supply of Used Handguns to Non-Criminal Consumers
The number of used handguns supplied to the market is not known,
but it is essential for an adequate analysis of the market for and
regulation of handguns. Philip Cook, Stephanie Molliconi, and Thomas
Cole estimate that about the same number of used and new guns change
hands each year. 54 Among the respondents to Cook and Ludwig's
245. Telephone Interview with Russ Thurman, Editor, Shooting Industry (Oct. 5,
1998).
246. Shooting Industry Magazine, Shot Show Issues.
247. See id.
248. U.S. Market for Firearms & Accessories, 1992-1997 54 (Paumanok Pub. Inc.,
Bus. Pub. Div., Shoreham, NY).
249. Id.
250. See COMMERCE AND FIREARMS, supra note 231, at 16.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 16-17.
254. Phillip J. Cook, Stephanie Molliconi & Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun
Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 69 (1995).
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survey of persons who acquired a handgun within the past two years,
31% say it was used.255 Thus, perhaps, one third to one half of handguns
are used when legally acquired.
Retail sellers of used handguns primarily are pawn shops, retail
dealers, and private individuals. The retail sellers obtain their stock from
distributors and other retailers, purchases from individuals, and as trade-
ins (similar to trade-ins by vehicle purchasers, except that, unlike
vehicles, handguns can remain in good operating condition a very long
time). Retail gun dealers and pawn shops must be FFLs and are subject
to the same federal and state laws and regulations as are required for new
handgun sales. Private sellers are subject to federal and some state laws
which limit to whom they may sell their firearms. However, as shown in
Table 1, 31 states do not require private handgun sellers to conduct
background checks or document the transfer of firearms; one of these,
though (Illinois), requires background checks for handguns sold at gun
shows.256
Ironically, an important source of used handguns is "law
enforcement trade-ins." The volume of these guns increased
substantially in the 1990s when many police departments and other law
enforcement agencies switched from revolvers to semi-automatics,
primarily 9mm. In part, this change was motivated by the military's
adoption of semi-automatic 9mm pistols. 257  Another reason for the
change was demand by law enforcement officers for a weapon that could
be quickly reloaded.258 In any event, because of the switch, a large (but
unknown) number of well-maintained handguns were sold to the general
public, presumably through licensed distributors and retailers. In
addition, handguns confiscated by police departments often are sold by
them to the public.259
3. Illegal Supply of Handguns to Non-Criminal Consumers
As noted earlier, some people who are not criminals (those who do
255. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 172, at 44.
256. See supra Table 1.
257. See supra note 86.
258. See Massad Ayoob, Guns 50th Police: It's Been a Helluva Ride the Last
Century, With an Almost Complete and Diametric Reversal of the Traditional Paradigm,
GuNs MAGAZINE, Jan. 2005, available at www.findarticles.com (follow "Sports"
hyperlink; then follow "Guns Magazine" hyperlink; then follow "January 2005"
hyperlink").
259. Id.
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not intend to use a gun for criminal purposes) demand handguns, but are
unable to obtain them legally, because of state and municipal licensing
laws that are administered restrictively. These people necessarily must
purchase a gun from someone who is not an FFL (an FFL could be
corrupt; however, they are unlikely to sell single or a few units to non-
criminals, because such people who are caught with illegally owned
handguns are likely to identify the FFL in exchange for leniency). If
these handgun demanders were willing to violate the law, they could
obtain a handgun in several ways. They could have an eligible person
buy a handgun for them in their own state. Or, if their state or city laws
are too restrictive and they have a relative or friend who resides in a less
restrictive locality, they could ask that person to purchase a gun for them.
These "straw purchasers" would be violating federal law, but they might
not realize or care about it.
Alternatively, the gun-demander could buy or be given a gun
previously purchased by a relative or friend. Or, a gun could be bought
from a private person who, perhaps deliberately, did not inquire about
the buyer's residence and legal right to own a handgun. Or, the buyer
could falsely claim that he or she is a state resident who is not legally
barred from handgun ownership. Although private handgun sellers
would have violated the law by selling to people who are not legal
purchasers, it would be very difficult for the authorities to prove that they
did so knowingly.
A person who wants a handgun also could simply take ("borrow")
one from a friend or relative. In this event, only the thief would have
violated a law. And, the person from whom the handgun was taken
might not want to report the theft to the police or might not realize that
the gun was stolen or could not prove who had taken it. In this situation
there would be no record of the crime.
Finally, the non-criminal purchaser might buy a gun "on the street,"
necessarily from a criminal. Such transactions, though, are likely to be
rare, and certainly are not advisable. The criminal could easily take the
potential purchaser's money and keep the gun, and the buyer could
hardly file a complaint with the police.
4. Illegal Supply of Handguns to Criminals
Criminals might obtain handguns from four sources. The first is
from straw purchasers - people who are legally entitled to purchase
handguns for themselves from FFLs and who buy and transfer handguns
to criminals who could not pass the background checks. The second is
49
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purchases from private individuals, who are not required to conduct
background checks. The third is purchases from gun traffickers, either
rogue FFLs or operators of rings of straw purchasers. Advocates of more
restrictive handgun laws claim that these traffickers buy handguns in
states with laws no more restrictive than federal laws and import these
handguns into states and municipalities with restrictive laws. The fourth
source is theft, handguns stolen by the criminals or sold to them by
burglars. The source from which criminals obtain handguns has
important implications for public policy, because sales of handguns by
legal sellers might be controlled, whereas thefts are affected only slightly
by laws that restrict handgun sales.
The supply of handguns to criminals can be quantified from their
responses to researchers' questions, analysis and estimates of straw
purchases and of trafficking revealed by ATF investigations of the
sources of handguns confiscated by the police and analysis of data on
handgun thefts. Theft appears to be the overwhelmingly important
source of criminal handguns. Wright and Rossi's study of adult
convicted felons in 1981 provides data on where and how criminals
obtain handguns.26 ° Of their sample, 939 convicted felons responded to
the question of where and how they obtained their most recent handgun,
in percentages, as follows:
26
'
Purchased from retail outlets (gun shop, pawnshop, hardware or department
store): 15%
Purchased from family and friends: 17
Purchased probably stolen handgun:
Purchased on the street: 12
Rented, borrowed or traded from family and friends or on the street: 16
Theft: 60
Gift: 8
In response to Wright and Rossi's question: "Was it new or used?,"
the answers are: 62% used, 33% new, and 5% don't know.262 They
asked: "Did you get it in or out of state?" and 77% said "in state" and
260. See WRIGHT & RossI, supra note 206, at 184-85.
261. Id. at 185-86.
262. Id. at 184.
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23% "out-of-state. 263 They also asked: "Once you decided to get it, how
long did it take?" The responses are:
264
Few hours: 60%
Day: 12
Few days: 18
Week or a few weeks: 7
Month or longer: 3
Wright and Rossi do not report whether the guns that were
purchased at retail were bought from in-state or out-of-state stores. If the
handguns were purchased at retail from FFLs, the purchases would have
had to have been made before the purchasers were convicted felons
(unless the FFLs did not conduct a valid background check), and in the
state (unless the purchaser later moved to another state).
A 1997 survey of Federal prison inmates by John Scalia finds that
14% "reported that they used, carried, or possessed a firearm while
committing the offense for which they were imprisoned. Most of these
inmates (86%) reported using a handgun., 265 Of these, 19% reported that
they purchased or traded for the firearm from a retail store or pawnshop,
4% from a gun show or flea market, 35% from a friend or family
member, and the balance (42%) from burglary, drug dealer, fence, or
black market.266
Interviews of seven thousand arrestees in eleven major urban areas
reveal that 37% on average said they had owned a gun.267 The
researchers report: "Fully 37 percent of the arrestees indicated they could
obtain a gun in less than 1 week.268 One in five suggested they would
need only one day or even less time, adding credibility to the notion that
the urban firearms market is quite accessible.
269
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. JOHN SCALIA, FEDERAL FIREARM OFFENDERS, 1992-1998: WITH PRELIMINARY
DATA FOR 1999, at 10, NCJ 180795 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report June
2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ffo98.pdf.
266. Id.
267. SCOTT DECKLER, SUSAN PENNELL & ARNI CALDWELL, ILLEGAL FIREARMS:
ACCESS AND USE BY ARRESTEES 1 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Research in Brief Jan. 1997),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/163496.pdf.
268. Id. at 3.
269. Id.
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Persons under age twenty-one are not permitted, under federal law
(1968 Gun Control Act), to purchase a handgun. 270 Nevertheless, several
studies have found that a substantial portion of juveniles have handguns.
For example, Sheley and Wright, who queried juvenile reformatory
inmates (average age 17) and inner-city high school students, report that
87% of the inmates and 65% of the students said they could get a gun
with little or no trouble.271 Buying on the street (often from a drug dealer
or addict) was the source mentioned most often by inmates (54% for
inmates, 37% for students), and borrowing from a family member or a
friend was also listed frequently (45% for inmates, 53% for students).
Only 12% of the inmates and 28% of the students mentioned buying
from a gun shop. 272 If, at that time, they were not at least twenty-one
years of age without a prior criminal record, they would have used a
straw purchaser or bought from a rogue FFL.
Thus, criminals appear to obtain about 12 to 23% of their handguns
from purchases at retail stores, either directly (before they have a
criminal record) or through a straw purchaser, about 42 to 60% from
theft or purchase from other criminals (who might have gotten the
weapons from thefts, straw purchasers, or rogue FFLs), and about 8 to
35% from gifts of guns that were legally or illegally purchased or stolen.
One can conclude, from these data and from the analysis presented next
that theft is, by far, the most important source of guns used by criminals.
It is unlikely that straw purchasers supply a substantial portion of
handguns to criminals, because it is likely to be an unprofitable
enterprise. Federal law requires FFLs to report sales of more than one
handgun within a five-day period to an individual purchaser to ATF.
Hence, to avoid being picked up, straw purchasers who seek to acquire
many handguns would have to frequent many stores, which entails travel
time, cost and multiple background checks (which might come to the
attention of the police authorities). Then the handguns have to be
transported to the receiving state and buyers for the guns who are not
likely to be police informants must be found. Unlike the situation for
drugs, few buyers want regular and repeated purchases of handguns.
Consequently, new customers must be found, which increases the risk of
detection. This cannot be a good way to make a dishonest living.
However, straw purchases may be made from individuals who
270. 1968 Gun Control Act, § 922(g), as amended by the Firearms Owners'
Protection Act (1986).
271. SHELEY & WRIGHT, supra note 216, at 46.
272. Id. at 47.
[Vol. 26:305
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss2/1
2006] LEGAL CONTROL OVER THE SUPPLY OF HANDGUNS 357
advertise handguns from their "private collections" for sale. These sales
do not require a background check. The Gun Control Act (1968) forbids
sales to residents of other states other than mail order sales (which are
explicitly mentioned); this prohibition, though, cannot be enforced. For
example, the seller (who is not required to maintain records) could claim
that the buyer presented proof of in-state residence, or the buyer could
get a local friend to make the purchase for him.
Two forms of straw purchasing have been distinguished. One is
labeled a "crime of opportunity," as described by Joseph Kelly, who
retired in 1996 after 25 years with ATF as a Special Agent and
Supervisor of the New York Group:
I think the main way guns come into the City of New York is through
crimes of opportunity when individuals are home where they came from a
Christmas visit or what have you, and they come across the path of
someone who has a gun for sale or wants to get rid of a gun or gives it
away and they bring it back spur of the moment. That's how I think the
vast majority of guns come into the City of New York and that there are
really extraordinarily little organized little groups that run guns back into
the City of New York.
273
The other form is "gun running," wherein criminals use straw
purchasers to buy quantities of guns that are transported for resale to
areas where guns are difficult or impossible for people to buy legally;
areas such as New York City, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.
274
Kenneth McCann, an officer for twenty-seven years with the New York
City Police Department and Commanding Officer of the Joint Firearms
Task Force from 1990 through 1994 (when he retired), describes two
such cases. One he describes as a "convenience trafficker who travels
back and forth from a state with lax firearms [sic] and transports
anywhere from two to thirty guns., 2 75 He then identifies the gun runners
as "two college students who attended Ohio State University and drove
to New York on the weekends. 276 They were arrested for selling seven
guns to an undercover New York City detective. The other "would
purchase firearms utilizing 'straw purchasers' at gun shows in Virginia
and North Carolina ... [moving] approximately 150 firearms to New
273. Deposition of Joseph Kelly at 1, 125, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp.
1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (No. 95 Civ. 0049).
274. See, e.g., Submitted Statement of Kenneth McCann at 1-2, Hamilton, 935 F.
Supp. 1307 (No. 95 Civ. 0049).
275. Id. at 1-2.
276. Id. at 2-3.
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York City., 2
77
The extent to which straw purchasing generally takes place is
revealed in a report of 1530 investigations of both handguns and long
guns conducted by ATF Special Agents in charge of 23 divisions
between July 1996 and December 1998.278 Following the Gun:
Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers includes 709
investigations of "firearms trafficked by straw purchasers or straw
purchasing ring., 279 In 695 of these investigations, 25,741 firearms were
diverted to the illegal market; the median number per investigation is
14.280 Of these 695 investigations, 387 (56%) involved actual straw
purchases from FFLs as distinguished from traffickers.28 ' Most of these
people purchased firearms for a friend, relative, intimate (spouse or
boyfriend), or fellow gang member; about a quarter purchased guns to
sell or trade for drugs. Unlicensed dealers were the subject of 301
investigations involving about 20,000 firearms.282 These include an
unidentified number of straw purchases.
Data on prosecutions of straw purchasers is included in a Bureau of
Justice Statistics Special Report, Federal Firearm Offenders, 1992-98.283
"During 1998, 341 defendants were convicted of a firearm receipt or
transfer offense. Detailed information was collected on 85% (288) of
those convicted . . . . 19% [56 cases] were identified as straw
purchasers." In more than two-thirds of the 56 cases ... the firearm was
purchased from a licensed firearms dealer.284 The Special Report does
not give separate statistics for straw purchasers. For the 288 cases
analyzed, 62% involved handguns; the median (mean) number of
firearms purchased is 3 (18 cases).285 Thus, in 1998 there were perhaps
25 cases of straw purchases of handguns from FFLs involving relatively
few handguns.
Trafficking is distinguished from straw purchases in that it involves
277. Id. at 3-4.
278. See, e.g., DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO &
FIREARMS, FOLLOWING THE GUN: ENFORCING FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST FIREARMS
TRAFFICKERS 11 (June 2000), available at http://www.atf.gov/pub/fireexplo-
pub/pdf/followingthegun-internet.pdf. [hereinafter FOLLOWING THE GUN].
279. Id.
280. Id. at 13.
281. Id. at 18.
282. See id. at 13.
283. SCALIA, supra note 256, at 5.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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the active participation of FFLs or rings that use straw purchasers to buy
many guns for resale to criminals generally. These "rogue" firearms
dealers could obtain a sufficient quantity of handguns for sale to
criminals to make the enterprise profitable. And, since they are criminals
themselves, they do not have legitimate businesses to lose if they are
caught. But, to avoid being caught, they must remove the serial numbers
from the handguns they sell to criminals, a procedure that entails some
cost. In addition, removing a serial number is a federal crime punishable
by five years in prison.
Even more so than straw purchasers, rogue FFLs face the problem
of finding new buyers who are not or will not become police informants.
In addition, they must compete with sellers of stolen handguns, who have
a considerable cost advantage. Indeed, Kelly testified that the profit
margin on an illegal handgun sale is "slight:"
It's from my experience over the years buying guns, it is never more than
double the retail price and I will tell you why. We had a policy, an
unwritten policy at ATF, that we would try to go 20, 30% over the retail
price if necessary, but no more because once you get beyond a certain state,
you are almost getting into an entrapment area. And we were never turned
down when we offered 20, 30 percent more than the retail price of a gun.
We are talking about a profit of $100, 150, 200. It was minimal. For
someone to risk prosecution and jail for $100, 200, 300 always floored
286me.
McCann, though, states that his New York City Joint Firearms
Taskforce arrested 15 federal firearms licensees during 1990 to 1994,
who "were responsible for purchasing and distributing 4,315 firearms in
the New York area., 287 In his statement, he describes the activities of
thirteen "rogue gun dealers" (located in many cities around the nation),
six of whom sold between 1000 and 2937 guns illegally.
288
Information on trafficking is provided by Following the Gun:
Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers.289  The study
defines trafficking very broadly to include any "illegal diversion of
legally owned firearms from lawful commerce into unlawful commerce,"
286. Deposition of Joseph Kelly at 123-24, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp.
1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (No. 95 Civ. 0049).
287. Submitted Statement of Kenneth McCann at 1-2, Hamilton, 935 F. Supp.
1307.
288. Id.
289. See FOLLOWING THE GuN, supra note 269, at 3.
55
PACE LA WREVIEW
including guns obtained from burglaries.29° Of the 1530 investigations
reported, about 581 (38%) appear to involve trafficking. 29I Of the 581
trafficking investigations, 198 are identified as "trafficking in firearms at
gun shows and flea markets" that diverted 25,862 firearms to the illegal
market.292 Corrupt FFLs are said to be responsible for a substantial
portion of trafficking in new firearms; particularly because each FFL
investigated diverted a mean number of 350 firearms into the illegal
market.293 Further, the Treasury study notes that when an FFL was
acting as the sole trafficker in an investigation, or working with an
unlicensed dealer, the mean number of guns per investigation rose to
over 560.294 However, very few FFLs appear to be corrupt. Some
evidence on this issue is provided by a study conducted by Glenn Pierce
for ATF of traces of firearms to 83,272 retail gun dealers and
pawnshops. 295 In 1998, 85.7% did not have any traces, 14.3% had one,
7.2% two to five, and 2.7% five to ten. Only 2% had ten or more traces.
Thus, among the thousands of FFLs, very few sold handguns that were
used by criminals, as indicated by handguns confiscated by the police
and traced by ATE.
By far the greatest source of handguns used by criminals is theft.
An indication of the number may be gleaned from the number of stolen
guns reported to the FBI. The FBI's National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) stolen gun file, which was initiated in 1967, contained 1.26
million reports of handguns not recovered as of March 1995 and 2.34
million as of July 1999.296 Marianne Zawitz reports that the Department
of Justice's National Criminal Victimization Study "estimates that there
were 341,000 incidents of firearm theft from private citizens annually
from 1987 to 1992 [53% are handguns; thus, approximately 181,700
handgun thefts appear to have been reported]. Because the survey does
not ask how many guns were stolen, the number of guns stolen probably
exceeds the number of incidents of gun theft., 297 Cook, Molliconi and
290. Id.
291. See id. at 13.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 12.
294. Id. at 41.
295. See id. at Table 3.
296. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, REDUCING ILLEGAL
FIREARMS TRAFFICKING: PROMISING PRACTICES & LESSONS OF CRIMINAL LAW &
CRIMINOLOGY, NCJ 180752 (July 2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/bja/1 80752.pdf.
297. MARIANNE W. ZAWITCH, GUNS USED IN CRIME 3, NCJ 148201 (U.S. Dept. of
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Cole estimate from data on thefts in North Carolina that, on average, 1.5
firearms are stolen per theft, of which 68% are handguns. 298 Based on
this number plus an additional 11% "to take account of gun thefts from
commercial locations," they estimate that 567,000 firearms are stolen per
year. 99 Cook and Ludwig's 1994 survey asked respondents: "In the past
12 months, have you, or has anyone in your household, had any firearms
stolen from them [excluding thefts at work]? ' 30 0 From the responses,
they calculate that 269,000 gun-owning households experienced a
theft.30 1 Using these numbers and data reported in Cook, Molliconi and
Cole, Cook and Ludwig estimate that 211,000 handguns and 382,000
long guns-593,000 in total-were stolen.30 2 These are lower bounds,
they warn, because they also find that "a large number of firearms may
be stored in American households without the full knowledge of all of
the adult members living at home. 30 3
Indeed, as noted earlier, Kleck finds an average of five guns per
household.30 4 Cook and Ludwig report that 42.1% of individuals who
own guns have four or more guns.30 5 The ATF compilation of firearms
investigations finds a mean (median) of 21.5 (7.0) firearms per
investigation "stolen from a residence. 30 6 For this reason, the number of
guns per theft and the total number stolen reported above (and widely
quoted) appear to be substantially understated. Using the higher number
of thefts cited by Zawitz (341,000) and the median number of four
firearms per household reported by Cook and Ludwig, a better estimate
is 1,364,000 firearms stolen per year. If about 53% of these are
handguns, then about 723,000 handguns a year might be considered to
have been stolen (if the ATF-reported median number stolen was 7 guns
per household, 1,265,100 handguns per year were stolen).
The more conservative estimate of 723,000 handgun thefts is most
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Selected Findings July 1995), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/guic.htm.
298. See Cook, Molliconi & Cole, supra note 245, at 82.
299. Id.
300. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 172, at 32.
301. Id. at 31-32.
302. Id. at 32. How they arrived at these numbers is unclear; they do not provide an
explanation. Cook, Molliconi & Cole, supra note 245, report 1.5 firearms per theft,
which multiplied by 269,000 thefts yields 403,500.
303. Id.
304. See KLECK, supra note 170, at 69.
305. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 172, at 35.
306. See FOLLOWING THE GUN, supra note 269, at 13.
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likely substantially understated. Only about half the burglaries that occur
tend to be reported to the police.307 And, Kleck cites a "BATF study of
300 crime guns [that] found that, among those which had been stolen,
only 21% had been reported to the police. 3 °8 Furthermore, the reported
thefts probably do not include guns stolen from illegal owners of guns
(particularly in New York City, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.),
because these are unlikely to be reported to the police. Nor do the
numbers include thefts from commercial establishments and common
carriers. In 1998 and 1999, FFLs reported that 27,287 firearms were
stolen; common carriers are not required to report thefts.309
Consequently, at least 1,500,000 handguns are stolen annually and,
presumably, diverted into the illegal market.310
In comparison, the number of handguns made available to criminals
through straw purchases and trafficking of weapons obtained from FFLs
and private sellers appears to be relatively small. The volume of units
(not all of which are handguns) reported in ATE firearms investigations
between June 1996 and December 1998, most of which are ascribed to
straw purchases and trafficking, total 84,128, or an average of about
31134,000 a year. In conclusion, criminals obtain handguns
predominantly from thefts.
IV. An Analysis of the Court's Use of Economic Testimony
In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,312 argued before the United States
district court, the defense's argument, largely supplied by Professor
George J. Benston, was that there is a huge stock of handguns in
existence and, therefore, it would not make a difference if the gun
manufacturers exercised more care while the plaintiffs' position was that
criminals preferred new guns because there was not a "body on it,"
therefore, they obtained their guns like everyone else from gun dealers
307. SHANNAN M. CATALANO, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2003, at 10, NCJ 205455
(U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cv03.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
308. KLECK, supra note 170, at 92. The report on firearms violations states:
"Figures on stolen firearms are subject to the usual problems associated with determining
whether a firearm has been stolen, due to the fact that most gun owners do not report
stolen firearms to the police." FOLLOWING THE GUN, supra note 269.
309. See KLECK, supra note 170, at 27-28.
310. Id. at 92 (conducts a similar analysis and concludes: "[iun sum, the number of
guns stolen each year could be from .57 to 1.82 million.").
311. See supra Table 3.
312. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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and gun shows.
The plaintiffs argued that, because each manufacturer's contribution
to the supply of illegal handguns helps to place killing instruments in the
hands of criminals, each manufacturer should be held partially
responsible for the resulting injury.31 3 It is the underground market,
created and stocked by the defendants' negligence rather than by any one
manufacturer's product, which caused the plaintiffs' injuries. 3 14  The
plaintiffs reasoned that, because of the defendants' negligence, gun
dealers in the south were able to sell handguns to straw purchasers, who
then transported the guns to New York and sold them to criminals, such
315
as the shooters in the present case.
The decision manifests that Judge Jack Weinstein carefully read and
considered the economic testimony provided by Professor Benston.
Judge Weinstein stated [the defendants] "retained an expert, Dr. Benston,
who prepared and proffered evidence as to the market share statistics in
both his deposition and at trial. 3 16  The Court rejected the economic
testimony, however, and held:
Guns used in crime are increasingly being linked to federal firearms
licensees ("FFLs"). Recent federal law enforcement review of illegal gun
trafficking investigations conducted in twenty-seven cities between 1996
and 1998 reveals that 51% of guns used in crimes by juveniles and persons
between the ages of 18 and 24 during that period were acquired from FFLs
by intermediaries acting on their behalf.... According to analysis of 1998
crime gun traces from these twenty-seven cities, up to one-third of guns
used in crimes by juveniles and one-half of those used by persons between
ages 18 and 24 were purchased from an FFL within three years of the
commission of the crime.
317
Judge Weinstein disregarded the economic evidence presented by
Benston and instead relied upon the testimony of Joseph J. Vance,
former Chief of the Crime Gun Analysis branch of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Vance testified: "we have not seen
stolen firearms being employed by criminals. The majority of the time
313. See id. at 844.
314. Id.
315. See also Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
316. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
317. Id. at 825-26. As noted earlier, these data exclude handguns that were not
traced because they were manufactured before 1985. When these handguns are included
in the data, Benston's change to Table 9 finds that only 23% were purchased within one
year of their having been confiscated by the police.
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we are seeing them getting them from retail sources. 31 s
Judge Weinstein also relied on a pamphlet produced by the Sporting
Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute. Its content supported an
inference of industry awareness of an illicit handgun market traceable in
significant part to retail sources unsupervised and uncontrolled by their
"suppliers," the manufacturers and their "agents," the distributors. 319 The
district court quoted evidence produced by Dr. Howard Andrews, a
research scientist and professor at Columbia University School of Public
Health, that most of the guns used in New York crimes come from
outside New York.32 ° Judge Weinstein adopted the plaintiff s analysis of
the case:
The jury could also have credited the extensive documentary and oral
evidence presented with regard to the flow of guns-particularly from the
states of the southeast, where, experts testified, it is relatively easy to
purchase a gun, to the states of the northeast, where it is relatively difficult
to obtain one-and the high proportion of New York crime guns traceable
to out-of-state sources.
32 1
The district court held for the plaintiffs322, contrary to the economic
evidence presented by Benston and others. The evidence:
[W]as sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the negligent
marketing and distribution of handguns by manufacturers was a substantial
factor in the promotion and development of an underground illegal market
supplying New York criminals, and thus increasing the probability of death
or serious injury such as that suffered by Mr. Fox. 32 3
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit felt that the above decision in the United States District Court
raised substantial questions of New York state law. It, therefore,
certified two questions to the Court of Appeals of New York:
whether there is a duty owing by these defendant gun manufacturers to
plaintiffs ... and if there is such duty, whether liability may be apportioned
on the basis of the negligent manufacturers' market share.
3 4
The New York Court of Appeals, in answering the certified
318. Id. at 830.
319. Id.
320. Id. 830-31.
321. Id. at 830.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 838.
324. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).
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questions, rejected the reasoning of the United States district court and
instead adopted Professor Benston's argument:
The pool of possible plaintiffs is very large-potentially, any of the
thousands of victims of gun violence. Further, the connection between
defendants, the criminal wrongdoers and plaintiffs is remote, running
through several links in a chain consisting of at least the manufacturer, the
federally licensed distributor or wholesaler, and the first retailer. The chain
most often includes numerous subsequent legal purchasers or even a thief.
Such broad liability... should not be imposed without a more tangible
showing that defendants were a direct link in the causal chain that resulted
in plaintiffs' injuries, and that defendants were realistically in a position to
prevent the wrongs. Giving plaintiffs' evidence the benefit of every
favorable influence, they have not shown that the gun used to harm plaintiff
Fox came from a source amenable to the exercise of any duty of care that
plaintiffs would impose upon defendant manufacturers.
325
In rejecting the district court's decision, the New York Court of
Appeals concluded:
[N]one of plaintiffs' proof demonstrated that a change in marketing
techniques would likely have prevented their injuries. Indeed, plaintiffs did
not present any evidence tending to show to what degree their risk of injury
was enhanced by the presence of negligently marketed and distributed
guns, as opposed to the risk presented by all guns in society.
3 26
The New York Court of Appeals relies upon Professor Benston's
economic reasoning to reject the plaintiff's duty argument:
The negligent entrustment doctrine might well support the extension of a
duty to manufacturers to avoid selling to certain distributors in
circumstances where the manufacturer knows or has reason to know those
distributors are engaging in substantial sales of guns into the gun-
trafficking market on a consistent basis. Here, however, plaintiffs did not
present such evidence.... General statements about an industry are not the
stuff by which a common-law court fixes the duty point.... Without a
325. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061-62 (N.Y. 2001). To
support its conclusion, the court reasoned: "[o]ne of the original plaintiffs was Katina
Johnstone. Her husband was killed with a Smith & Wesson revolver. The gun was
recovered and traced to its lawful owner, who had reported it missing after a burglary of
his home two weeks before the shooting." Id. at 1062 n.2.
326. Id. at 1062. The New York Court of Appeals was convinced that the large
number of handguns in existence would dwarf any attempts at due care by handgun
manufacturers: "[h]ere, imposing such a general duty of care would create not only an
intermediate class of plaintiffs but also an indeterminate class of defendants whose
liability might have little relationship to the benefits of controlling illegal guns."Id at
1063 (citing Waters v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 69 N.Y.2d 225, 230 (1987)).
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showing that specific groups of dealers play a disproportionate role in
supplying the illegal gun market, the sweep of plaintiffs' duty theory is far
wider than the danger it seeks to avert.
327
An assessment was made by Judge Weinstein that the defendants'
negligent marketing was responsible for perhaps one-third of the
plaintiffs' injuries. 328  The New York Court of Appeals concluded,
however, that at least two-thirds of the injuries were likely caused by
guns that had been obtained by their users through theft or illegal
purchases:
Plaintiffs do not contend that negligent marketing of handguns is the sole
source of handguns used in crime. They acknowledge that some injuries
from handguns [in the stockpile] will still occur. Indeed, the District Court,
using BATF data, assessed the enhanced risk at 33%, leaving a significant
probability that plaintiffs' injuries from unidentified weapons came from
guns that had not been negligently marketed (see, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62
F. Supp. 2d, at 826 [noting that only one third of all guns used in juvenile
crimes come directly from FFLs]).329
In accepting the negative answers by the New York Court of
Appeals to the two certified questions, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted the economic argument:
Given the lack of evidence of "any statistically significant
relationship between particular classes of dealers and crime guns,"
however, it [referring to the New York Court of Appeals] reasoned that
imposition of such a general duty of care would create large,
indeterminate classes of plaintiffs and defendants "whose liability might
have little relationship to the benefits of controlling illegal guns. 33 0
327. Id. at 1064. To support this point, the court cited the following statistic:
An analysis of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) data for 1998
reveals that a very small number of FFLs do account for a significant portion of
guns used in crimes. "Just about 1.2% of dealers-Il,020 of the approximately
83,200 licensed retail dealers and pawnbrokers-accounted for over 57 percent of
the crime guns traced to current dealers in 1998."
Id. at 1064 n.5 (citations omitted).
328. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
329. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1067 n.11.
330. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 28 (2d Cir. 2001). The New
York Court of Appeals' discussion of the second certified question, market share liability,
is examined infra, Part V.
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V. An Analysis of the Legal Reasoning in the United States District
Court and the New York Court of Appeals
A. Primary Legal Issues
After a four week trial, Judge Weinstein ruled on three critical legal
issues: the fundamental cause of action, negligent marketing; duty; and
the applicability of market share liability. These issues are examined in
turn.
After dismissing the first two causes of action, the district court
refused to dismiss the plaintiffs count in negligent marketing.331 Judge
Weinstein stated the negligent marketing theory as follows:
The heart of the plaintiffs' theory ... is the claim that defendants'
negligence in methods of marketing handguns and flooding the handgun
market has fostered the development of an extensive underground economy
in handguns. Through this underground market, it is suggested, youths
may readily illegally obtain handguns which they then use, resulting in the
deaths of individuals such as the decedents represented by the plaintiffs in
this court.
No one claims that defendants intended their guns to be used illegally to
hurt anyone. There may, however, come a point that the market is so
flooded with handguns sold without adequate concern over the channels of
distribution and possession, that they become a generic hazard to the
community as a whole because of the high probability that these weapons
will fall into the hands of criminals or minors prohibited from possession
under state and federal law.
332
331. These are discussed later in the section.
332. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1330 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The New
York Court of Appeals also outlined the plaintiffs' position in regard to the straw
purchases and gun show aspects of negligent marketing. The court stated:
According to plaintiffs, handguns move into the underground market in New York
through several well-known and documented means including straw purchases (a
friend, relative or accomplice acts as purchaser of the weapon for another), sales at
gun shows, misuse of Federal firearms licenses and sales by non-stocking dealers
(i.e., those operating informal businesses without a retail storefront). Plaintiffs
further assert that gun manufacturers have oversaturated markets in states with
weak gun control laws (primarily in the Southeast), knowing those "excess guns"
will make their way into the hands of criminals in states with stricter laws such as
New York, thus "profiting" from indiscriminate sales in weak gun states.
Plaintiffs contend that defendants control their distributors' conduct with respect to
pricing, advertising and display, yet refuse to institute practices such as requiring
distribution contracts that limit sales to stocking gun dealers, training salespeople
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Judge Weinstein outlined in detail the steps that could be taken by
the defendants in order to avoid negligence in the marketing of their
handguns:
Defendants' ongoing close relationship with downstream distributors and
retailers putting new guns into consumers' hands provided them with
appreciable control over the ultimate use of their products. Even if they
could not control what the first "consumer" would do with the gun or
whether it would fall into the hands of a person other than the new gun
owner, they could reduce the risk of criminal misuse by ensuring that the
first sale was by a responsible merchant to a responsible buyer ....
[U]nder a negligence regime, manufacturers can avoid liability by
marketing and distributing their product responsibly.
333
The district court found there were specific changes in marketing
the defendants could have made in order not to be negligent: "declining
to do business with careless or unscrupulous FFLs, limiting sales at
unregulated gun shows, and requiring the first sales of handguns to the
public take place only in fully stocked, responsibly operated stores. 334
Judge Weinstein concluded by embracing the jury verdict in favor
of the plaintiffs:
[T]here was sufficient evidence to persuade a rational jury that criminal
misuse of handguns was a reasonably foreseeable result of defendants'
negligent marketing and distribution practices; that easy access to illegal
guns increases gun violence and homicide; that Mr. Adkins shot Mr. Fox
with an unlawfully obtained handgun of a type that the Fox defendants
manufactured [and distributed]; that this .25 caliber crime gun was
originally diverted from a lawful retail source; that the gun used would not
have been available to Mr. Adkins had the Fox defendants taken reasonable
preventive measures; and thus that defendants' negligence proximately
in safe sales practices (including how to recognize straw purchasers), establishing
electronic monitoring of their products, limiting the number of distributors,
limiting multiple purchases and franchising their retail outlets.
Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1059-60.
333. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
334. Id. at 831. In doing so, they quoted the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Stewart, who
generated a list of steps handgun manufacturers could feasibly take to reduce the risks
associated with their products, including franchising retail outlets, restricting distribution
to qualified retail stores, and termination of the distribution agreements of those
distributors who sell handguns irresponsibly. Id. at 831.
A trace request is part of a tracking system that the ATF uses to find out who sold the
gun that was used in a crime. Careless gun dealers have more trace requests than careful
ones. Id. at 830-31. The court in Ileto referred to these as ATF reports. Ileto v. Glock,
349 F.3d 1191, 1215 (9th Cir. 2003).
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caused Stephen Fox's injuries. 335
Before examining the New York Court of Appeals analysis in its
answers to the two certified questions, it will be helpful to consider how
the United States district court handled three foundational issues: duty,
proximate cause and market share liability.
The first critical issue faced by the district court was duty. Judge
Weinstein clarified the defendants' duty "[t]he precise duty alleged in
this case is that of handgun manufacturers to exercise reasonable care in
marketing and distributing their products so as to guard against the risk
of its criminal misuse.,
336
The District Court believed that placing a duty to exercise care upon
the manufacturers and distributors would help to deter crime.337
The district court focused on an important facet of proximate cause,
criminal intervening cause, when the defendants argued that their
negligent conduct, if any, was superceded by the criminal shootings.
Judge Weinstein rejected the defense argument:
Under New York law, an intervening intentional or criminal act by a third
party is not automatically deemed a supervening act insulating the initial
tortfeasor from liability .... Where "the intervening act is a natural and
foreseeable consequence of a circumstance created by defendant, liability
will subsist."
338
The court cited the Nallan339 and Derdiarian340 cases:
335. Hamilton, 62 F.Supp. 2d at 839.
336. Id. at 824.
337. The court stated:
Imposition of a duty to exercise care in the marketing and distribution of handguns
will maximize safety .... Holding defendants liable when injuries result from
their failure to exercise due care is likely to encourage more prudent
manufacturing and distribution practices. This potential deterrent effect is of
particular importance, where, as here, the legitimate market is saturated.
Id. at 827.
338. Id. at 833. California reached the same result in Ileto. 349 F.3d at 1208-09
(the Ninth Circuit applying their interpretation of California law).
339. Id. at 833-34 (citing Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451, 458
(N.Y. 1980) (intentional shooting of plaintiff in lobby of office building with history of
criminal activity was not a supervening cause exonerating building owner and manager
from liability but a significant foreseeable possibility)).
340. Id. at 834 (citing Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y.
1980) (a construction company was not insulated from liability by intervening acts of
negligent driver who entered a highway work site, where risk of such an event was what
rendered company's failure to safeguard site negligent. As the New York Court of
Appeals has made clear, "when the intervening, intentional act of another is itself the
foreseeable harm that shapes the duty imposed, the defendant who fails to guard against
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Defendants' reliance on the doctrine of supervening cause is misplaced. As
already demonstrated, criminal misuse of handguns by third parties was not
only a reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendants' negligent
marketing and distribution practices, it was the precise risk; failure to take
reasonable steps to guard against it is what made defendants' conduct
negligent.
34 1
All of this changed when the New York Court of Appeals answered
the first certified question-duty. In rejecting a duty to the plaintiff, the
court focused on the court's administrative problem: "[The] judicial
resistance to the expansion of duty grows out of practical concerns, both
about potentially limitless liability and about the unfairness of imposing
liability for the acts of another."
342
The New York Court of Appeals also believed that there were too
many possible plaintiffs to make this suit administratively feasible; in
relation to the defendants, the shootings were remote:
The pool of possible plaintiffs is very large-potentially, any of the
thousands of victims of gun violence. Further, the connection between
[defendants], the criminal wrongdoers and plaintiffs is remote, running
through several links in a chain consisting of at least the manufacturer, the
federally licensed distributor or wholesaler, and the first retailer.
343
The court's holding that the shootings were "remote" in relation to
the defendants is subject to numerous interpretations: 1) The criminal use
of the gun was not foreseeable to the manufacturer. The manufacturers
could not foresee that some handguns (whether or not sold in great
volume) would flow into the hands of criminals in New York.344 2) Such
use was not near to the manufacturer. A criminal, not the seller, pulled
the trigger.345 3) It is "unfair" to place the loss on the gun manufacturers.
All things considered, including the thinness of cause-in-fact and the
shooting by a third party.346 4) The criminal had much more to do with
the injury than the manufacturer. Only the shooter should be held civilly
such conduct will not be relieved of liability when that act occurs"). Id.
341. Id. at 835.
342. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 2001).
343. Id. at 1061-62.
344. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., Ltd. (Wagon
Mound I), [1961] 1 App. Cas. 388 (J.C. 1961). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that such criminal shootings were foreseeable. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1198, 1203
(9th Cir. 2003).
345. See Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
346. See Green, Duty Problem, supra note 141, at 1034; see also Green, Duty
Problem II, supra note 153, at 255.
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liable.347 5) The court is not prepared to deal with the liability of gun
manufacturers at this time. In terms of politics, New York is not ready to
hold the gun manufacturers liable.348 6) The district court-made law, this
is the function of the New York legislature. 349 7) This is too much loss to
place on the defendants. Gun manufacturers are small and liability might
put them out of business. 350 8) The cause-in-fact connection is thin. The
criminal shooter had a much more substantial impact on the injury than
the negligence of the manufacturer.35' 9) Handguns are a part of the
fabric of America and, at this time, it is inappropriate for this court to get
involved in the debate. Handguns are as American as apple pie and
should therefore be protected.352 10) The ultimate conclusion that can be
347. Criminal intervening cause.
348. See Green Duty Problem, supra note 141, at 1035.
349. The court strongly suggested that the issue before it was one for the
legislature: "we should be cautious in imposing novel theories of tort liability while the
difficult problem of illegal gun sales in the United States remains a focus of a national
policy debate." Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1066 (N.Y. 2001).
When an issue is felt to be the province of the legislature, but the court nevertheless
decides the question, it is referred to as "judicial legislation." H. Sterling Burnett argues
that the district court decision in Hamilton v. Beretta is judicial legislation. See H.
Sterling Burnett, Suing Gun Manufacturers: Hazardous to Our Health, 5 TEX. REv. L. &
POL. 475 (2001). However, Jean Macchianoli Eggen and John G. Culhane reject that
view and argue that existing gun legislation is ineffective and that guns are largely
unregulated. Jean Macchianoli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Gun Torts: Defining a Cause
ofAction for Victims in Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 81 N.C. L. REv. 115, 128, 130,
181 (2002). Absent regulation, there is a need for state involvement and suits against gun
manufacturers. Id. at 132. John S. Vernick and Julie Samia Mair argue that suits against
the gun manufacturers can promote public health. John S. Vernick & Julie Samia Mair,
How the Law Affects Gun Policy in the United States: Law-Intervention or Obstacle to
Prevention, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 692, 693-95 (2002). The CPSC and ATF lack the
authority to regulate guns. Id. at 700. See also Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman,
Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 224, 233,
235 (2002).
350. But gun manufacturing is a small industry as compared to tobacco, for
example. The defendants' negligence, if any, was small as compared to the possible
damages. VANDALL & WERTHEIMER, supra note 89, at 1374 n.293. However, Bryce A.
Jensen suggests that the gun manufacturers are the appropriate parties to carry the loss
(damages) in gun litigation. H. Sterling Burnett argues, "[t]he cases ... provide no legal
basis for making gun manufacturers insurers against the misuse of their products via the
judiciary." Burnett, supra note 340, at 477.
351. See Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further
Ramifications on Cause-In-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 CoNN. L. REv. 1379
(2000). But in Ileto, the Ninth Circuit applied the substantial factor test for cause-in-fact
and allowed the negligence case to go forward against the manufacturer regardless of the
criminal intervening cause. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 2003).
352. This is arguably the thrust of the long concurring opinion in Emerson
embracing the Second Amendment. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir.
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taken from the court's holding that the conduct of the gun manufacturers
was remote is that the plaintiff loses. The many vague definitions of
proximate cause function to conceal the reality that the court has found
against the plaintiff.353  11) In economic terms, the costs of finding the
defendant liable exceed the benefits. Arguably, there is benefit to being
able to defend oneself with a gun.
In rejecting plaintiff's duty argument, the New York Court of
Appeals explained the unique role of foreseeability over-layered with
Professor Benston's economic argument in the holding: "[t]he large
number of guns in society present a continuing risk and the plaintiffs did
not 'show to what degree their risk of injury was enhanced by the
presence of negligently marketed. .. guns."
354
The New York Court of Appeals therefore answered the first
certified question in the negative: "analysis of this State's ... precedents
demonstrates that defendants ... did not owe plaintiffs the duty they
claim."
355
2001).
353. Dean Tom Galligan wrote, "the doctrine of remoteness is merely a label for
'no liability."' Thomas C. Galligan Jr., Deterence: The Legitimate Function of the Public
Tort, 58 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 1019, 1041 (2001).
354. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1062.
355. Id. at 1066. Because the New York Court of Appeals refused to find a duty
between the plaintiffs and the manufacturers, it did not have to consider whether the
defendants were negligent, but it did. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that
the gun manufacturers and dealers were not negligent in marketing their handguns:
While manufacturers may be generally aware of traces for which they are
contacted, they are not told the purpose of the trace, nor are they informed of the
results. The BATF does not disclose any subsequently acquired retailer or
purchaser information to the manufacturer. Moreover, manufacturers are not in a
position to acquire such information on their own. Indeed, plaintiffs' law
enforcement experts agreed that manufacturers should not make any attempt to
investigate illegal gun trafficking on their own since such attempts could disrupt
pending criminal investigations and endanger the lives of the undercover officers.
Id. at 1065.
Daniel L. Feldman, Director of the Legal Policy and Program Development Unit in the
Office of the New York State Attorney General, concludes that the message from
Hamilton v. Beretta is that a gun manufacturer may be held liable for negligence if only
cause-in-fact can be proved. Cause-in-fact might be shown if several FFLs had
disproportionately high trace results and the manufacturer foresaw it. However, as the
court of appeals recognized, ATF does not provide manufacturers with trace results and
prohibits them from taking actions on their own. Daniel L. Feldman, Not Quite High
Noon for Gunmakers, but It's Coming: Why Hamilton Still Means Negligence Liability in
Their Future, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 293, 295, 301, 302, 303, 313 (2001). "[T]he rationale
of that decision (Hamilton v. Beretta) can still be used to form the basis of some duty in
future gun control lawsuits." Charles C. Sipos, The Disappearing Settlement: The
Contractual Regulation of Smith and Wesson Firearms, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1297, 1321
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The second major issue faced by the United States District Court
and the New York Court of Appeals was market share liability. A
lynchpin issue in Hamilton v. Beretta was the fact that none of the
handguns used by the criminal actors had been identified or found.356 It
was therefore impossible to show which manufacturer or manufacturers
produced the guns that caused the injuries or deaths to the plaintiffs. In
order to overcome this hurdle, the plaintiffs argued market share liability.
After walking through an historical analysis of the four different
approaches to market share theory, the court stated: "At bottom, adoption
by a state's highest court of a theory of collective liability is a policy
decision., 357 The District Court reasoned through market share liability:
The jury could have concluded from the available evidence (1) that
defendants manufacture .25 caliber handguns and sell them in a national
market... (2) that it was likely that the .25 caliber handguns defendants
sold without taking reasonable precautions to prevent their entry into the
underground market found their way into New York, and (3) that Stephen
Fox was shot with a .25 caliber handgun illegally acquired from that
underground market. This evidence, considered in conjunction with the
evidence supporting the jury's finding that [defendants] did market and
distribute negligently, was sufficient to permit a rational jury to causally
and proximately connect these defendants' negligence to Stephen Fox's
injuries.
These guns were fungible.
The court went on to hold that "[h]is burden was satisfied by the
presentation of evidence from which rational jurors could conclude that
negligence on the part of each of the Fox defendants.., was a substantial
factor in bringing about Mr. Fox's injuries." 358
(2002).
In Ileto, the case is going forward against the gun manufacturers on pure negligence.
The guns were found. 349 F.3d at 1194.
356. Market share liability was not a problem in Ileto because the guns had been
found. Id.
357. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1329 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
358. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). The district
court presented the primary policy reason underlying market share liability: "[d]ecisions
to impose collective liability have been grounded in both moral and pragmatic
considerations. A primary motivating factor has been the injustice of barring innocent
69
PACE LA WREVIEW
Judge Weinstein took care to articulate the important policies
underlying market share liability:
Many of the same factors which have previously led the New York Court
of Appeals and other courts to relax the traditional rules of causation
militate heavily in favor of the imposition of market share liability in the
instant case. First, as in the case of DES, handgun plaintiffs are faced with
intractable problems of proof.... Contemporary developments are relevant
in deciding legal policy in favor of market share liability. The proliferation
of illegal handguns in urban areas, the resultant epidemic of handgun
violence among urban youth, and the gun industry's design and sale of
increasingly lethal readily concealed and cheap handguns have created a
crisis in today's cities. Many have now filed suits against handgun
manufacturers.
359
An essential requirement in applying market share liability is that
the product is fungible, that the handgun used in the shooting is
substantially similar to every other .25 caliber handgun manufactured by
the defendants. The district court reasoned that these handguns were
fungible, 360 and therefore concluded that market share liability applied to
these facts.36'
On appeal from the United States district court and the United
States court of appeals, the second certified question to be answered by
the New York Court of Appeals was market share liability. It first
acknowledged that it could refuse to decide the question of market share,
plaintiffs' recovery solely because of their inability to identify which of a number of
wrongdoing defendants caused their injuries." Id. at 841.
359. Id. at 843. The court added:
The same factors compelling recognition of a duty... support the imposition of
market share liability: 1) the superior ability of defendants to bear the costs
foreseeably associated with the manufacture and widespread distribution of
handguns; 2) the fairness of requiring them to do so since they can reduce the risks
by their ability to choose merchandising techniques; 3) the deterrent potential of
placing the burden on manufacturers careless of their responsibilities to the public;
and 4) the fact that injured plaintiffs ... did not choose their connection with
handguns.
Id. at 843-44.
360. The court stated:
Handguns, already found to be fungible for jurisdictional purposes... may also be
deemed fungible for substantive law purposes. . . . The fungibility of handguns,
and, thus, their amenability to market share analysis is even clearer when viewed
from the vantage point of shooting victims.
Id. at 844. However, the New York Court of Appeals held that the handguns involved in
the case were not fungible. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1067.
361. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
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because it had found that there was no duty extending to the plaintiff.
However, because of the importance of the question, it decided to go
forward with the analysis.362 The court carefully examined the holding in
the New York market share precedent, Hymowitz:
Key to our decision [in Hymowitz] were the facts that (1) the manufacturers
acted in a parallel manner to produce an identical, generically marketed
product; (2) the manifestations of injury were far removed from the time of
ingestion of the product; and (3) the Legislature made a clear policy
decision to revive these time-barred DES claims .... Circumstances here
are markedly different. Unlike DES, guns are not identical, fungible
products.... [P]laintiffs have never asserted that the manufacturers'
marketing techniques were uniform. Each manufacturer engaged in
different marketing activities that allegedly contributed to the illegal
handgun market in different ways and to different extents. Plaintiffs made
no attempt to establish the relative fault of each manufacturer, but instead
sought to hold them all liable based simply on market share. 363
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the applicability of
Hymowitz. Hymowitz was different because there each manufacturer
engaged in tortious conduct, the products were defective, and the risks
were uniform. 364 The New York Court of Appeals concluded by refusing
to apply market share to these facts and answering the second certified
question in the negative:
We recognize the difficulty in proving precisely which
manufacturer caused any particular plaintiffs injuries since crime guns
are often not recovered. Inability to locate evidence, however, does not
alone justify the extraordinary step of applying market share liability.365
B. Secondary Legal Issues
The district court weighed and decided a number of important but
362. The court stated:
The Second Circuit has asked us also to determine if our market share liability
jurisprudence is applicable to this case. Having concluded that those defendant-
manufacturers did not owe the claimed duty to these plaintiffs, we arguably need
not reach the market share issue. However, because of its particularly significant
role in this case, it seems prudent to answer the second question.
Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1066.
363. Id. at 1067. Evidence was offered by defendants in the district court that the
handguns were not, in fact, fungible. See the analysis of manufacturers' catalogues
presented supra Part III.
364. See id.
365. Id. at 1067.
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secondary issues that were avoided by the New York Court of
Appeals.366 A critical issue in almost all gun litigation is the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution.367 The threshold question
is whether the Second Amendment prevents states from regulating the
sale of handguns through common law litigation. The district court faced
this issue head-on and rejected the applicability of the Second
Amendment:
It is important to bear in mind that plaintiffs seek to enforce state, not
federal, tort law. Thus it is not necessary to plumb the deeper meaning of
the Second Amendment as it applies to Congress. The Amendment limits
congressional power over the colonial analogues of our National Guard. It
does not guarantee the right to kill. Nor does it inhibit state tort law.
368
The plaintiffs argued design defect as a foundational cause of
action. The court reasoned:
For a viable ... design defect claim against a handgun manufacturer, a
plaintiff must allege that a particular model in question is unreasonably
dangerous .... "[T]here must be something wrong with the product and if
nothing is wrong there will be no liability."... The mere act of
manufacturing and selling a handgun does not give rise to liability absent a
defect in the manufacturer or the design of the product itself.
369
366. These are styled secondary issues because the New York State Court of
Appeals chose not to rely on them in its decision. Other courts might find them decisive,
however.
367. The Second Amendment provides, "[a] well regulated militia, being necessary
to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
368. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1317 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The court
added: "[t]he Second Amendment does not control state tort law. It does not limit
regulation of private handgun sale for use through state tort law." Id. at 1321.
"[Tihe Framers intended the Second Amendment to guarantee an individual right to keep
and bear arms." William L. Mccoskey, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms
Shall Not Be Litigated Away: Constitutional Implications of Municipal Lawsuits Against
the Gun Industry, 77 IND. L.J. 873, 876 (2002).
In contrast,
[t]he Second Amendment was not intended to justify arming every Tom, Dick and
Harriet with an assault weapon .... Rather, the Second Amendment was intended
to provide a substitute for a standing army maintained by the federal government
.... The Second Amendment became superfluous with the advent of the United
States Armed Forces ....
Donna-Marie Korth & Candace Reid Gladston, The Second Amendment Was Not
Intended to Justify Every Tom, Dick and Harriet With an Assault Weapon, 17 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT 515, 516 (2003).
369. Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1323.
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The district court rejected the argument that the handguns were
defective because of the lack of an anti-theft safety device:
There is no valid basis for this claim.... Whether or not New York
products liability law would require an anti-theft safety mechanism...
requires a balancing of the risk and utility of incorporating such a device
into the design of handguns sold by defendants. Plaintiffs have not shown
that such a device is available ....
The plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturers should be liable
because the handguns were marketed in such a way that they could
readily fall into the hands of children, and therefore the manufacturers
were engaged in an ultrahazardous activity. 371 The district court rejected
the ultrahazardous activity count, however:
The New York Supreme Court recently ruled that a manufacturer could not
be held strictly liable under an ultrahazardous activity theory for
manufacturing and distributing guns .... Plaintiffs also have no basis for
holding defendants strictly liable under an ultrahazardous or abnormally
dangerous activity theory .... [T]his cause of action relates primarily to
the improper use of land. Marketing, while conduct, is not "activity"
within the meaning of this doctrine.
372
The court also granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs' fraud
theory:
Plaintiffs can not succeed on a fraud claim. They do not claim that they or
those whom they represent were deceived by the defendants. Rather, they
allege that the defendants deceived government officials and handgun
purchasers. Even assuming these allegations to be true, the plaintiffs may
not recover for fraud.
37 3
The New York Court of Appeals also rejected the plaintiffs
argument that an obligation to plaintiffs arose from marketing practices
in regard to a hazardous substance (such as dynamite). The court stated:
370. Id. at 1324. The court explained why it rejected the strict liability cause of
action. For strict products liability to apply there must be a defect in the product:
Recovery in strict liability in New York is predicated on the existence of a defect,
either in the design of the product, the manufacture of the product, or the warning
provided by the manufacturer. On the ground that the proof failed to fit the case
into one of these categories, courts have rejected strict liability claims against
manufacturers of guns and ammunition.
Id.
371. Id. at 1322.
372. Id. at 1323-24.
373. Id. at 1325.
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The cases involving the distribution or handling of hazardous materials...
do not support the imposition of a duty of care in marketing handguns. The
manufacturer's duty in each case was based either on a products liability
theory-that is, the product was defective because of the failure to include
a safety feature-or on a failure to warn.... Here, defendants' products are
concededly not defective-if anything, the problem is that they work too
well.... Likewise, this case can hardly be analogized to those in which a
duty has been imposed upon owners or possessors of hazardous
substances .... 374
Preemption has become an important and effective products defense
in the last few years.375 It is now possible to tell students that any time
there is a federal regulation or statute on point, they may be able to argue
that it preempts the state statute or common law cause of action.376 The
United States District Court in Hamilton v. Beretta forcefully rejected the
defendants' preemption argument, however:
Congressional design is clear. Federal laws controlling the sale and
distribution of firearms do not preempt state tort law .... The only way a
federal law regulating the handgun market can preempt state common law
is through a direct conflict making mutual compliance impossible.
Defendants have not shown how any remedy sought by plaintiffs would
force noncompliance with federal handgun laws governing sales, licensing,
and distribution. Plaintiffs seek only to demonstrate the state law required
gun manufacturers to take greater precautions than are required under
federal law.
3 7 7
As a means of economizing in the litigation of suits, plaintiffs have
often sought class action certification.37 8 The plaintiffs argued that the
class in this case would consist of persons killed or injured in unlawful
handgun shootings, and the representatives of such persons.379 The court
reasoned: "For a plaintiff-class action to be maintained, four
prerequisites must be met: numerocity such that joinder is impractical,
common questions of law or fact, typicality of claims or defenses, and
the extent to which plaintiffs are representatives of the class. 3 80 The
district court, after examining the facts, rejected class action certification:
374. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1062-63 (N.Y. 2001).
375. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 866 (2000).
376. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
377. Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1321.
378. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 554 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84
F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
379. Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1331.
380. Id. at 1332.
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"There has been no showing to date that resolution of the issues sought
for class certification would advance the interests of judicial economy
and efficiency. Certification is denied with leave to renew."
381
VI. Conclusion With Respect to Hamilton v. Beretta and Issues of
Public Policy Towards Handgun Control
The effectiveness of economic theory in an actual case has not
heretofore been evaluated. The question presented by this paper is the
extent to which economic argument or legal theory drove the court's
decision in Hamilton v. Beretta. The New York Court of Appeals, in
refusing to hold the handgun manufacturers liable was resting its
decision in substantial part on Professor Benston's economic argument
that liability against the manufacturers would have little impact on the
problem of handgun violence. He testified before the district court that
because there are at least 200 million handguns in existence, holding the
manufacturers liable would do little to affect the flow of handguns to
criminals.
382
In terms of legal analysis, the court selected the most flexible and
amorphous element in the negligence formula for the foundation of its
decision, duty. As Dean Leon Green taught over seventy years ago,
"remote" can mean anything.383
This analysis of Hamilton v. Beretta from both a legal and an
economic perspective reveals that in the end, the court of appeals relied
on the specific facts in the case in making its decision. The court was
informed by the law and by economics, but in the final analysis, it was
this court's decision based on the facts of the particular case, all in regard
to what the judges believed was appropriate for society at this time.
A. Professor Benston's Conclusions
The analysis of the legal issues in cases such as Hamilton v. Beretta
and the outcome of that case indicate that this means of affecting the
381. Id.
382. Ileto is going forward against the handgun manufacturers on the negligence
theory. It is different from Hamilton because the guns were found and it involves an
appeal prior to trial. Hamilton involved an appeal after trial. Also Ileto is the Ninth
Circuit's guess as to California law, while Hamilton in the Superior Court, was applying
New York law. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
383. See generally Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 116. Green was
specifically referring to "sole proximate cause."
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supply of handguns is not likely to be effective. But, even if such
lawsuits were won, the supply of new handguns is unlikely to be
substantially constrained by costs imposed on domestic manufacturers.
As shown in Table 5 supra, 34% of the new handguns sold in the United
States in 1996 were imported, up from 26% in 1989. There are many
handguns produced in other countries which, were there an increase in
the costs of domestic production (perhaps as a consequence of legal and
other costs imposed on U.S. manufacturers), could readily replace or
even displace U.S. produced handguns. Furthermore, there are no
barriers to entry into the domestic manufacture of handguns. As shown
in Part III, there were 51 manufacturers of at least 250 handguns a year
in 1989 and 48 at year-end 1996. During this period, 65 companies
began production and 68 discontinued production. Table 5 and Figure 2
show that the annual amount of handguns manufactured and imported
has changed substantially over the period, as has the proportion provided
by individual companies. Hence, even if the major manufacturers
suffered substantial legal damages and/or became bankrupt, their output
would rapidly be replaced by new producers (who probably would use
the former manufacturers' molds and machinery) and by imports.
What then are the alternatives available to people who are
concerned about and hope to reduce handgun violence? Researchers and
legislators have offered several remedies, ranging from restrictions on
the supply of handguns by bringing used as well as new handgun
purchases under federal laws, increasing the cost of guns to purchasers,
extending the more restrictive laws of some states to all states, and
reducing the demand by criminals for handguns.
1. Cook and Ludwig's Proposals to Restrict Handgun Supply
In their book, after estimating the financial cost of gun violence of
$100 billion a year, Cook and Ludwig propose several "remedies. 384
They say: "The heart of the policy response to gun violence focuses on
efforts to reduce gun use in crime by restricting supply and thus making
it more difficult, time consuming, or costly for a violent individual to
obtain a gun., 385 They advance three approaches: regulate all handgun
sales, ban handguns, and design improvements.386
384. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 10, at 117.
385. Id. at 118.
386. Id. They also mention gun buyback programs. However, they dismiss these
because "the results are likely to be trivial where 40 million households own guns and 4
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Cook and Ludwig state: "First on our list is the regulation of
secondary-market gun sales, which [they claim, incorrectly as indicated
by the analysis presented in Part II, supra] is the main source of guns
used in crime." 387 They would require "mandatory registration of all
handguns [and] require that all transactions be channeled through FFLs,
and that FFLs report every transaction to ATF. ' 388 But, even assuming
Congress would impose this requirement, an analysis by James Jacobs
and Kimberly Potter shows how readily federal laws, particularly the
Brady Act, can be evaded. 389 They point out that, except for felony
records maintained by the FBI, there is no central databank that can be
accessed to check other prohibited characteristics of handgun
purchasers.3 90  Felons also could employ straw purchasers. Most
importantly, a private person who did not want to use the services of an
FFL could sell handguns virtually with impunity, both because the sales
could not be traced back to the seller and, in the event they were, the
seller could claim that the gun had been stolen.391 In fact, Cook and
Ludwig cite research (including their own) indicating that the Brady Act
has had little effect on reducing gun injuries.392
A feasible proposal to require registration and licensing of handguns
was introduced in the 104th Congress as part of the Handgun Control and
Violence Prevention Act of 1995 (Brady II). Jacobs and Potter evaluate
this proposal.393 They point out that it would apply only to handgun
purchases and transfers, which ignores the 89 million handgun stock, as
million new guns are added to this private inventory each year." They also point out that
such programs allow people to sell old guns at a profit and "upgrade to newer more lethal
firearms." Id. at 10.
387. Id. at 10.
388. Id. A similar proposal is made by KLECK, supra note 170.
389. See James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns Out of the "Wrong"
Hands: The Brady Law and the Limits of Regulations, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 93
(1995).
390. See id. at 105.
391. See also James B. Jacobs & Daniel M. Heumann, Extending Brady to Gun
Shows and the Secondary Market, CRAM. L. BULL. 248 (May-June 2001). They describe
and analyze a 1999 proposal (The Gun Show Accountability Act, H.R. 1903, 106th
Cong.) to extend the Brady Act to gun shows. As they do in their earlier article on the
Brady Act, they show how easy it would be for a seller to avoid the act. For example, the
seller could say he does not have the firearm with him, but will sell it later if the
purchaser meets him elsewhere. Id.
392. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 10, at 121-22.
393. James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Comprehensive Handgun Licensing &
Registration: An Analysis & Critique of Brady II, Gun Control's Next (And Last?) Step,
89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 81, 89 (1998).
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of 1996. As shown in Figure 1 supra, annual sales of new handguns are
only two to four percent of the stock. Jacobs and Potter also show how
easily a licensing system could be evaded.394 For example, an unlicensed
person could persuade a gun owner to sell or lend him a gun, could use a
counterfeit or stolen license, employ a straw purchaser, or just steal a
gun. If the gun were traced (somehow) to the seller, he could claim that
the purchaser (who he did not know) presented him with a license or that
the gun was stolen.
395
Cook and Ludwig do not propose a national ban because "little is
currently known about the net effects of such a change on public safety,
or the value of other intangible costs that such a policy would impose on
gun owners. In any event, a handgun ban is infeasible in the current
American political context." 396  Indeed, in September 2004 the U.S.
House of Representatives refused to extend the ban on military-style
assault weapons and large-capacity bullet clips enacted in 1994 with a
sunset clause, despite strong support for the extension by the
International Association of Chiefs of Police and other organizations.
The strong demand for and ownership of handguns by large numbers of
legitimate users, that is described and documented in Part II supra,
supports the conclusion that more restrictive legislation is unlikely to be
enacted.
Cook and Ludwig also consider bans on specific guns (e.g., cheap,
small "Saturday Night Specials," "assault weapons," and high-capacity
magazines). They conclude that there "is likely to be some reduction in
the lethality of gun misuse, though there is admittedly little direct
empirical evidence to support our hypothesis" and "the long-run effects
are likely to be quite modest. 3 9
7
Finally, they mention requiring manufacturers to make design
improvements that would make stolen handguns useless to criminals.
They say that "[t]he most important design change is the development of
personalized (or 'smart') guns," that could be fired only by an owner
394. Id. at 93-97.
395. Id. This brief and partial summary does not do justice to the careful analysis
presented by Jacobs and Potter. They also consider the analogy to automobile and driver
licensing. They show that these regulations are not applicable to handguns (e.g., it is
easy for law enforcement officers to determine and check the validity of the licenses), nor
have regulations governing automobiles been very successful in preventing accidents or
solving crimes (e.g., many accidents are caused by drivers who do not have valid licenses
and criminals who use stolen cars rather than their own).
396. Id. at 119-20.
397. COOK& LUDWIG, supra note 10, at 129.
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398
who wore, perhaps, a ring coded to the gun. Handgun manufacturers
have been attempting to develop such a weapon, because it would likely
be very popular with police, who risk having their handguns taken and
used against them by criminals. Such efforts, though, appear to have
been unsuccessful. In any event, such devices could be disabled by
criminals and, of greater importance, the enormous stock of working
handguns would still be available to criminals.3 99
2. Increase the Price of Handguns
Cook, Molliconi, and Cole argue: "[i]f effective regulation could
make it more difficult for youths and criminals to buy guns from dealers,
two notable consequences would result. First, one of the leaks in the
regulatory system which helps to supply proscribed individuals would be
plugged. Second, the total number of guns in circulation would
decrease ... prices would then rise, thus encouraging youths and others
to economize on gun possession."400  Cook and Leitzel also propose
imposing a federal excise tax on firearms produced or imported to
increase the price of firearms in order to decrease the firearms
demanded.4°1
Higher handgun prices, though, should have little effect on demand
for weapons by criminals, because criminals use handguns for two
essential purposes. One is to protect themselves from other criminals,
particularly in drug-related crimes. The price of a weapon sufficient for
this purpose is of little importance to a criminal whose life is in danger.
The second is to intimidate the victims of crime to force them to give up
their funds and, at times, their persons, to the criminal. A used handgun
would be sufficient for this purpose.
Furthermore, criminals obtain many (probably most) of their guns
from theft, as shown in Part II supra. Considering that there are at least
85 million privately owned working guns in the United States, a
reduction in the supply of new handguns would have little effect on the
398. Id. at 133.
399. Laws requiring handgun owners to store their weapons in locked containers
also appear to have been ineffective and possibly even perverse. See e.g., John L. Lott,
Jr. & John E. Whitley, Safe-Storage-Gun Laws: Accidental Deaths, Suicides, and Crime,
44 J.L. & ECON. 659 (2001).
400. Cook, Molliconi & Cole, supra note 243, at 79.
401. Philip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, "Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy": An
Economic Analysis of the Attack on Gun Control, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 104-
07 (1996).
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availability of handguns to criminals. Indeed, it would tend to increase
thefts as a consequence of an increase in the market price of stolen guns.
3. Nationally Adopt the Restrictive Laws Enacted by Some States and
Municipalities
Legislators in states and cities with restrictive handgun control
laws have complained that gun traffickers can and (they claim) do
purchase weapons in states with weak laws, and then import these
handguns for criminal use or sale their the restrictive venues.402  This
externality, they believe, cannot be dealt with except with a federal law
that is as restrictive as the laws of their states or cities. In particular,
Senator Charles Schumer (D. N.Y.), perhaps the most persistent and
emphatic legislative proponent of greater gun controls, has claimed that
ATF gun-trace data "shows that gun runners funneled thousands of guns
from a handful of mostly southern states with weak gun laws to criminals
in the Northeast and Midwest where gun laws are much more strict.' 4 03
In an earlier press release, he says: "Several interstate highways are
'firearm freeways' -favorite smuggling routes for gunrunners. Illegally
transported guns head north up 1-95 from Florida, Georgia and South
Carolina to New York, New Jersey and Massachusetts, or north from
Mississippi along 1-55 to Illinois. ' 404 This was the argument made by
plaintiffs in Hamilton v. Beretta.
Data are available on over 200,000 "crime handguns" (as they are
called) confiscated by police departments nationally over 1996-1998 that
were submitted to ATF for tracing.40 5 For each handgun, these data
include the city and date where and when it was confiscated, the crime
associated with the handgun, the age and race of the possessor (where
402. Press Release, Charles E. Schumer, New Gun Running Data Shows: Florida,
Mississippi and Texas Top Nation in Supplying Guns to Out of State Criminals (June 11,
2000) (on file with author).
403. See id.
404. See Charles E. Schumer, War Between the States: How Gunrunners Smuggle
Weapons Across America (1997).
405. George J. Benston, The Supply of Handguns to Criminals: Evidence from
Firearms Tracing Data (2005) (unpublished working paper on file with author). An
analysis of a much more limited amount of these data was presented in Hamilton v. Accu-
Tek for the plaintiffs by Ms. Lucy Allen and Mr. Jonathan Portes of NERA. Their use of
these data and their conclusion drawn there from that purport to show that manufacturers
"oversupplied" handguns to retailers in states with "lax" laws, was criticized and
reanalyzed by Dr. Gustovo Bamberger of Lexecon. Benston's analysis uses a much
larger data set (not available to the other experts at the trial).
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known), the state of the last FFL who sold it, and the age and race of the
purchaser (when recorded). Although there is no comparable source of
information on handguns presumably used by criminals, the data suffer
406from some important limitations and biases. The most important
limitation is that confiscated handguns can be traced only to the last
purchase from an FFL; whether the gun subsequently was privately sold
or stolen is not known. The data are biased towards finding that
confiscated handguns came from other states, for several reasons. One is
that police who can use in-state tracing systems (e.g., New York) tend to
not submit in-state purchased handguns for federal tracing. Another is
that handguns might have been legally purchased in one state and legally
transported to another, after which they were stolen. An additional bias
is that handguns are likely to come from states where they are more
prevalent and from which there are more guns available for theft. These
states tend to be those with less restrictive laws. Thus, a finding that
handguns confiscated in states with restrictive laws tend to have been
purchased in other states would be consistent with the "lax law" or the
"theft" hypotheses. In part for those reasons, ATF claims that a short
(less than three years) "time-to-crime," the years following the last FFL
sale and confiscation by the police, provides a useful measure of
purchases by straw purchasers and gun traffickers.0 7 However, newer
guns also are more likely to be traced, because ATF cannot readily trace
handguns essentially manufactured before 1985.
States were classified according to whether their laws are
"restrictive," "somewhat restrictive," or had "no additional restrictions"
beyond federal laws, as shown in Table 1.408 Contrary to the claims of
the plaintiffs experts in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek (who did not analyze the
data according to the restrictiveness of all state laws, but simply assumed
that all southern states have "lax" laws), the ATF tracing data are not
consistent with the claim that crime handguns confiscated in states and
cities with restrictive laws tend to have been purchased from FFLs in
states with "lax" laws. Although the percentage of confiscated handguns
purchased in the same state is significantly lower for restrictive states
(44% versus 63% in the somewhat restrictive states and 70% in the states
406. See Gary Kleck, BATF Gun Trace Data and the Role of Organized Gun
Trafficking in Supplying Guns to Criminals, 18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 23 (1999).
407. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORTS: THE ILLEGAL YOUTH FIREARMS
MARKETS IN 27 COMMUNITIES (THE YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE), Part II
at 12 (Feb. 1999).
408. See supra Table 1.
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with no additional restrictions), it is as likely that the other confiscated
handguns were purchased in states with similarly restrictive laws or
somewhat restrictive laws, as in states with no additional restrictions.
Furthermore, handguns confiscated in states and cities with no additional
restrictions often were purchased in states with restrictive laws. Indeed,
many states are the "sources" of traced handguns, and those to which
relatively more handguns were traced tend to border on the states where
the handguns were confiscated, regardless of their laws. These are
consistent with crime handguns having been obtained from thefts, rather
than from FFLs in states with presumably lax laws.4 °9
Nor is the restrictiveness of state laws associated with shorter "time
to crime" (time between purchase from an FFL and time when gun was
obtained by police), a presumed measure of straw purchases. ATF
"time-to-crime" studies exclude handguns that were not traced because
they were manufactured before 1985. However, when these older
handguns are included (the state where confiscated is known), the data
show significantly shorter times-to-crime of one, two, and three years for
handguns confiscated in restrictive states compared to somewhat
restrictive states and states with no additional restrictions. These
findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that straw purchases are
more prevalent in states with no additional restrictions.
Thus, increasing the restrictiveness of federal laws to match those of
the most restrictive states is unlikely to reduce the supply of handguns to
criminals. Indeed, almost any attempt to restrict the supply of handguns
is unlikely to reduce the use of these weapons by criminals. And, even if
it were possible to keep handguns from most or even many criminals,
they could readily substitute sawed-off shotguns and rifles for handguns.
These weapons do considerably more damage to persons than do bullets
shot from handguns. 41'
In contrast to the small, if any, effect on criminals, increases in the
cost and availability of new handguns is likely to reduce the quantity of
this product that can be purchased by non-criminals. Not only would this
be an unwarranted reduction in their well-being, but might result in an
increase in crime. Lott has shown that the prospect that non-criminals
might carry concealed handguns has resulted in substantial reductions of
murder, rape, and aggravated assault in the jurisdictions where such laws
have been enacted.4 11  Although some researchers (e.g., Dezhbakhsh,
409. Id.
410. See KLECK, supra note 170, at 135-39.
411. See LoTr, JR., supra note 36.
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Rubin, and Duggan), though, have criticized Lott's analysis, none has
found that the laws permitting people to carry concealed handguns has
resulted in an increase in crime or in accidents or death. 412  Thus, the
imposition of costs on domestic new handgun manufacturers and
distributors and established importers would tend to substantially damage
ordinary people for whom this product serves legal, legitimate, and
useful purposes.
4. Reduce the Demand for Handguns
Actions that reduce the demand for handguns by criminals and by
ordinary people whose handguns might be stolen might offer a more
promising solution to the problem of handgun violence. Cook and
Leitzel suggest: "perhaps more promising is to deter gun theft by
assigning special priority to prosecutions of defendants accused of
stealing guns or to mandate stiffer penalties for thefts of guns than for
thefts of other items of similar value. ' 41 3  They also would have
handguns registered and make "the record owner liable for misuse of his
gun by others, unless he had reported the guns stolen or could
demonstrate that the gun had been transferred legally. '4 14 Assuming this
proposal would be enacted by the Congress (which is doubtful, because
the Congress has explicitly forbidden the federal government from
keeping records of handgun sales, to say nothing of registrations), it is
unlikely to be effective, considering the very large number of handguns
already in public hands.
Criminals might be deterred from using handguns if penalties were
increased. Cook and Leitzel suggest this remedy, but believe that it is
412. Dezhbakhsh & Rubin, supra note 37, at 468-74; see also Duggan, supra note
37, at 1086-1114. Duggan uses subscription data to a magazine, Guns & Ammo, to
measure handgun ownership. Based on these data, he finds that statistically, significantly
more homicides occur in counties where handgun ownership is, presumably, greater.
Lott, though, finds that when data from similar magazines and more relevant magazines
(e.g., American Handgunner and Handguns Magazine) are used, the relationship is not
significant. Florenz Plassman & John Whitley, Confirming More Guns, Less Crime, 55
STAN. L. REv. 1313 (2003). Furthermore, Moody & Marvel show that Duggan's use of
magazine subscriptions as a proxy for handgun ownership is misspecified. Carlisle E.
Moody and Thomas B. Marvell, Remarks at the Southern Economics Association
Meeting: Guns and Crime (Nov. 17, 2001). They use subscription data from the five
largest gun-related magazines (including Guns & Ammo), employ a simultaneous
equation model, and find that handgun ownership (as measured) tends to precede
murders, rather than the reverse, as reported by Duggan.
413. Cook & Leitzel, supra note 392, at 114.
414. Id. at 113.
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inadequate, because "in most instances the perpetrator of a gun crime is
judgment-proof in the sense that he would be unable to pay a fine as
large as the cost to the victim. '415 Additional punishment also has been
suggested. Cook and Leitzel also see this "solution" as inadequate:
"even if all those who misused guns were apprehended and punished,
there would still be too much gun misuse from society's point of
view. '' 416  Cook and Ludwig, though, say: "we are encouraged by
evidence suggesting that sentencing enhancements may reduce gun
violence. 417 Kleck reviews many such empirical studies and concludes:
"Discretionary add-on penalties for committing crimes with guns may
reduce homicide, robbery, and rape, while mandatory ones do not. 418
In the concluding paragraph of a book in which he closely examines
hundreds of empirical studies and discusses a wide range of issues
related to gun violence, Kleck concludes:
[s]ignificant, lasting reductions in violence are not likely to be produced by
revisions of the criminal laws, reallocation of law enforcement resources,
or tinkering with crime control strategies, whether they involve the
conservative panaceas of "getting tough" on criminals and making war on
drugs, or the liberal panaceas of offender rehabilitation and gun control
(Walker, 1994). In the long run, solving the violence problem will have to
involve reducing economic inequality, injustice, and the social disorder
these generate. It will have to involve improving the life chances of the
underclass that contributes the bulk of both the victims and the perpetrators
of violent crime.
4 19
I agree with Kleck. I also want to point out that, although our study
of the demand, supply, and regulation of handguns supports the view that
the demand for handguns by non-criminals makes additional regulation
by legislators unsupportable and the conditions under which handguns
are produced and distributed makes legal constrictions on supply
ineffective, it does not support repeal of current (particularly federal)
legislation. The study and other similar studies necessarily are based on
data produced with that legislation in place. It is not known whether,
absent current restrictions, handgun crime would have been greater or
less. For those people who are appalled by the cost of handgun violence
(with whom we stand), this is an unwelcome conclusion. However, it is
415. Id. at 96.
416. Id. at 97.
417. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 172, at 133.
418. See KLECK, supra note 170, at 363.
419. Id. at 396.
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better to recognize the ineffectiveness of attempts to legally further
restrict the supply of handguns then to waste resources to enact laws that
would do almost nothing to reduce handgun violence, while reducing the
well-being of ordinary people who find handguns beneficial.
B. Professor Vandall's Conclusion
The issue we analyzed in the paper was whether the gun
manufacturer's economic argument had an impact on the court's
decision. The New York District Court rejected the argument that since
there was a huge stockpile of guns,420 care on the part of the
manufacturers would have no impact on gun violence. In contrast, the
New York Court of Appeals expressly relied on the stockpile argument
and held that the connection between the alleged negligent marketing by
the manufacturers and the gun violence was "remote" and therefore not
compensable.421
We did not address the larger issue of whether suits against gun
manufacturers have a role to play, at this time, in our justice system.
That question is still being litigated. In the similar California case of
Ileto, the gun was found, and the case has been remanded for trial.422 In
addition, there remain numerous municipal suits against the gun
manufacturers that have not been finally decided.423 They ask whether
424the design or negligent marketing of guns constitute a public nuisance.
In regard to the supply argument, Professor Benston takes the view
that since there is a huge stockpile of old guns, society can do nothing of
importance to reduce gun violence by attempting to hold manufacturers
to a standard of reasonable care. I disagree.
If gun manufacturers are held liable for negligent marketing, the
price of guns will increase and, therefore, fewer guns will be purchased.
It does not follow, as Benston suggests, that at a higher price, the demand
for guns will stay the same. Economics works for all products and there
is no apparent reason that it would not work for guns.
Also, we are looking at a litigation model that is affected by time.
There may be little impact on violent crime tomorrow, but asking
420. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 2001).
421. Id.
422. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1218 (9th Cir. 2003).
423. See D.C. Court of Appeals Throws Out Ruling That Dismissed City's Suit
Against the Gun Industry, P. R. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 20, 2004.
424. Id.
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handgun manufacturers to exercise care is likely to have a positive long-
term impact.
Automobile air pollution is a good example. In the late 1960s when
the automobile air pollution laws went into effect, there was a
widespread feeling that the concept of cleaner cars would not work
because there were millions of polluting ones in the "stockpile." Today,
we know that the pollution controls on cars have helped to reduce air
pollution and we also know that there are very few of the old polluting
cars still on the road. The stockpile is almost gone. Collector cars are an
exception, of course.
The same will likely be true in regard to handguns. When the gun
manufacturers begin to exercise care in marketing, it will become more
difficult and expensive for criminals to obtain new guns. Over time, the
stockpile for guns will dwindle just like it has for old polluting cars.
Professor Benston's conclusion wrongly shapes the paper as a brief
against banning handguns. That is not what I envisioned as the theme of
our paper nor what was litigated in Hamilton. The issue in Hamilton was
much simpler: should handgun manufacturers be required to exercise
care, just like everybody else.
Professor Benston also implies that negligence based lawsuits will
bankrupt some gun manufacturers. This is not preordained. If the gun
manufacturers are held liable, the manufacturer will have several options.
They can take the specific model off the market (like the Ford Pinto),
absorb the cost themselves, raise the price of the gun (tobacco), spread
the cost among other products, redesign the gun, increase advertising,
and lastly, close down.425
Quoting John Lott's study in a paper with our limited scope is
problematic. Lott's conclusion that there will be less shootings if more
people carry guns is suspect and dangerous. First, Lott's methodology is
suspect because his sample is too small. This has been carefully
documented by Dezhbakhlsh and Rubin. 2 6 Secondly, Lott's conclusion
is dangerous. Doctor Kellerman's study manifests family members and
guests are much more likely to be shot when there is a gun in the
home.427 Lott fails to take into account the real risk to members of the
home.
Ayres and Donohue critique Lott's conclusion as follows:
425. See Vandall, O.K. Corral I, supra note 3, at 553-57.
426. Dezhbakhsh & Rubin, supra note 37.
427. See A.L. Kellerman & D.T. Reay, Protection or Peril? An Analysis of
Firearm-Related Deaths in the Home, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1559 (1986).
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John Lott and David Mustard managed to set the agenda for much
subsequent... work on the impact of guns on crime in America by
creating ... a powerful statistical argument that state laws enabling citizens
to carry concealed handguns [shall-issue laws] had reduced crime....
On the surface, the... data ... appear to establish a prima facie case that
shall-issue laws, reduce crime ....
Nevertheless, their results have not withstood the test of time.... [T]he
previous Lott and Mustard findings proved not to be robust. Importantly,
we showed that the Lott and Mustard results collapse when the more
complete county data is subjected to less-constrained jurisdiction-specific
specifications or when the more-complete state data is tweaked in plausible
ways. No longer can any plausible case be made on statistical grounds that
shall-issue laws are likely to reduce crime for all or even most states.
428
Professor Benston's open embrace of handgun ownership, and of
the gun industry marketing techniques, along with quoting Lott with
enthusiasm, impliedly supports a call for a fully armed citizenry. Ayres
and Donohue offer several reasons why having an armed citizenry may
lead to more crime rather than less:
First.... it might.., increase the number of criminals who decided to
carry weapons themselves (... illegally) and also might increase the speed
at which a criminal decides to shoot.., potential victims.... Arming the
citizenry can encourage an arms race, leading more criminals to carry even
higher-powered weapons and to discharge them more quickly when
threatened.
Second, . .. the injection of a gun into an angry dispute, perhaps in lawful
defense, might escalate a minor dispute into a criminal homicide or a
serious wounding.
Third, with some estimates suggesting that as many as one million or more
guns are stolen each year, we know that putting more guns in the hands of
the law-abiding population necessarily means that more guns will end up in
the hands of criminals.... [T]he presence of more guns can actually serve
as a stimulus to burglary and theft [because guns are easy to transport and
sell].
Fourth, allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons imposes burdens on
police in that they must ascertain whether the gun is being carried legally.
428. Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less
Crime'" Hypothesis, 55 STAN L. REV. 1193, 1197, 1270, 1296 (2003).
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Finally, accidental deaths and suicides are obviously aided by the presence
of guns, and these costs could conceivably outweigh any benefits of shall-
issue laws in reducing crime.
429
Benston's arguments in favor of continuing the sale of guns under
present regulations (or less) raises the specter we all know to be true: "A
moment's reflection on one's own acquaintances would likely suggest
the names of numerous angry or intemperate individuals who could pass
the [present standards for purchasing a handgun] even though the
prospect of their carrying a ... weapon would not be likely to enhance
one's sense of personal security. '' 3 °
A question Professor Benston ducks is why we are not seeing
creative gun-violence legislation from Congress. Although a majority of
reasonable people (including President Bush who pledged in 1999 to
support the ban) wanted the assault weapon ban extended by Congress, it
was not.43 1 We are talking about law suits and not creative legislation
because Congress has walked away from its obligation to protect the
people. If society wants to deal with gun violence, the courts are the
only available venue.432 This was also true with tobacco.
The holding in Hamilton v. Beretta is that if you have recovered the
gun and can therefore prove cause-in-fact, you can sue the gun
manufacturer for negligent marketing. Hamilton does not suggest that
suits are not available to hold gun manufacturers to the standard of
reasonable care. Tobacco provides a cautionary lesson against false
bravado. Although hundreds of suits against tobacco manufacturers were
filed from 1958-1996, the tobacco manufacturers did not pay one cent for
tobacco caused cancer. They agreed in 1996 to pay $206 billion.
One of Professor Benston's main arguments is that most guns are
stolen, not purchased new. The New York District Court rejected that
argument and found that most guns are purchased and come from outside
New York. Even if a fair percent of guns are stolen, it does not follow
that requiring gun manufacturers to exercise care in marketing will not
have a meaningful impact on violence over time. The probable time
period for reducing gun violence is not today or tomorrow, but perhaps
429. Id. at 1204-06.
430. Id. at 1203 (material added, Ayres quote was in reference to Lott's "shall
carry" argument).
431. Gil Kerlikowske, Renew Assault-Weapons Ban, SEATrLE TIMEs, Aug. 25,
2004, at B9.
432. However, the police are working to reduce gun violence in Boston. See
Kennedy, Piehl & Braga, infra, note 433.
[Vol. 26:305
88http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss2/1
2006] LEGAL CONTROL OVER THE SUPPLY OF HANDGUNS 393
10 years from now.
Professor Benston states that the data from ATF gun tracings are
available, but that is not accurate in regard to the most important party,
the gun dealer. The New York Court of Appeals made clear that gun
"tracings" are not available to the gun dealers by federal statute, and
dealers must stay out of the tracing process.433
Professor Benston states in his conclusion "I agree with Kleck." He
may, but I do not. I reject the unsupported notion that we must wait for
society to improve before we can rein in gun violence. Hamilton v.
Beretta is not the last lawsuit, it is one of the first. As with tobacco, the
social accounting through litigation may be close at hand.434
C. Rejoinder by Professor Benston to Professor Vandall's Conclusion
Professor Vandall contends that, despite the presence of a huge
stockpile of old guns, holding manufacturers to a standard of care would
reduce gun violence. I agree with him that if costs were imposed on
manufacturers by holding them liable for negligent marketing, the price
of guns would increase and fewer handguns would be purchased.
However, I see two major problems with this means of reducing handgun
violence, both of which reflect the usual conclusion drawn by economists
that partial constraints on supply can rarely substantially affect the
amount of goods demanded.
First, most handguns used by criminals are stolen. Higher prices of
new handguns would affect only non-criminals and, possibly, straw
(criminal) purchasers. Although this would reduce the supply of guns
available for stealing, the effect would be very small. Furthermore, as
the data presented earlier show, even if domestic handgun manufacturers
were substantially disadvantaged or even put out of business, a
substantial proportion of handguns are imported, and it is almost trivially
easy for new manufacturers to go into the business and produce a very
large number of handguns. Also, unlike cars, handguns do not
deteriorate irretrievably. Consequently, the higher costs would have but
a slight effect on the supply of new handguns, and no effect at all on the
very much larger supply of existing handguns.
433. "[M]anufacturers... are not told the purpose of the trace, nor are they
informed of the results. The BATF does not disclose any... information to the
manufacturer." Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1065 (N.Y. 2001).
434. From the mid-1950s until 1994 tobacco manufacturers had not paid one cent.
See Frank Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries that led to the Proposed $368.5
Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 473 (1998).
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Second, handgun manufacturers cannot prevent criminals from
obtaining handguns; hence, their marketing practices (whether negligent
or not) are irrelevant. Manufacturers almost always sell to distributors,
who decide which federal firearm licensed (FFL) retailers to supply.
Neither the manufacturers nor the distributors are privy to the
information on traces of criminal handguns, the only available
information on the sources of handguns used in or associated with crime.
Whether or not this limitation is a result of lobbying by the NRA, the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), which conducts the
traces, insists that its investigations would be compromised if non-police
people had this information. But, of greatest importance, handgun
manufacturers can have no control over the use by criminals of stolen
handguns or over the substantial resale of handguns by private persons.
Professor Vandall nevertheless contends that criminals prefer new
guns over stolen handguns. Although this preference has been stated as a
"fact," it is not based on research and is inconsistent with the existing
research. In any event, it should be noted that, if that new handgun is
confiscated by the police, it can be readily traced to the FFL who sold it
and to the person who purchased it. From there, it could be traced to the
criminal. A stolen handgun, though, is much safer.
Finally, Professor Vandall has neglected the benefits to many
people from handgun ownership and use in activities that many people
enjoy, such as target shooting and collecting. Handguns also offer
hikers, campers, and farmers' protection from dangerous animals. Some
people who live far from the police or who believe they cannot count on
the police importantly find handguns valuable for protection from
criminals and other wrong-doers. Instead, Professor Vandall argues with
the validity of John Lott's findings that laws permitting people to carry
concealed handguns reduce violent crime, research which I simply noted
in a footnote. Whether or not Lott has credibly shown that violent crime
declines substantially when such laws are enacted, no one has shown that
violent crime increases.
435
D. Surrejoinder by Professor Vandall
A study by the Department of Justice, resting on 648 ATF illegal
gun trafficking investigations, involving youth ages 18-24 and juveniles
ages 17 and under, revealed that 78% of the investigations involved new
435. Kellerman's study cited by Professor Vandall is irrelevant, as carry laws do
not affect people who have handguns in their homes.
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guns, while 55% involved used guns. 436 This suggests that, at least in
regard to the ATF investigations, new guns were fairly-often used in
crime. The study revealed that some of the guns were obtained through
"illegal diversion from retail sources," and some from "purveyors of
stolen guns., 437 Other sources for crime-guns included "interstate and
intrastate trafficking in new firearms, used firearms, and in new and used
stolen firearms. 438 The study also manifests that 43% of guns recovered
from the 18-20 age group were on the street less than three years after the
initial sale by an FFL.439 All of this suggests that new guns sold by
licensed FFLs may play an important role in violent crime. At an earlier
point in the paper, Professor Benston argued that most crime-guns are
stolen from the huge stockpile of old guns.440 The implication was that
new guns play a minor role in gun-related crime and therefore the
plaintiffs' theory in Hamilton was far-fetched. The DOJ study of
recovered crime-guns suggests that a fair portion of weapons used in
violent crime are new. This implies that requiring gun manufacturers to
exercise care in marketing may indeed have a meaningful impact upon
the violence generated by new crime guns.
441
This view is supported by anecdotal evidence that youth offenders
prefer to purchase new guns because they do not want "a body on it."5
442
A stolen gun is viewed as a liability by young criminals, because it may
have been used in a shooting. Apparently, youthful offenders prefer not
to do time for someone else's crime.
Finally, one of the foundational reasons for torts is to compensate
436. THE DEPT. OF THE TREASURY & THE DEPT. OF JUSTICE, GUN CRIME IN THE AGE
GROUP 18-20, at 17 (1999) [hereinafter DOJ]. Since more than one of the firearms could
have been recovered in an investigation, an investigation could be included in more than
one category. That explains why the total of investigation exceeds 100%. "[W]e have
not seen stolen firearms being employed by criminals. The majority of the time we are
seeing them getting them from retail sources." Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d
802, 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
437. DOJ, supra note 427, at 3.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 13.
440. See supra note 298 and accompanying text. Criminals obtain handguns
predominantly from thefts.
441. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826, 827.
442. David M. Kennedy, Anne M. Piehl, & Anthony A. Braga, Youth Violence in
Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy, 59 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 170 (1996). "[Y]outhful offenders seem to prefer new...
guns. They regularly use the phrase 'new in the box' to describe the last gun they
bought." Id. at 169.
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the victim.443 The theory of compensation is separate from the theory of
deterrence that was the core issue in Hamilton v. Beretta. Even if
Professor Benston has grounds for arguing that holding the handgun
dealers and manufacturers liable in negligence will only have a slight
impact on reducing handgun violence, the negligent parties should,
nevertheless, be required to compensate the innocent victims.
443. See generally W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 5
(5th ed. 1984); FRANK J. VANDALL, ELLEN WERTHEIMER, & MARK C. RAHDERT, TORTS,
CASES AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 2003).
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